Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-96-061 *28 March 1996*

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Albania: Socialist Party Congress Adopts Resolution

AU2803152096 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 26 Mar 96 p 7

["Resolution of the Socialist Party Second Congress," approved in Tirana on 24 March: "The Socialist Party's Main Objective for the Election Campaign: We Will Win More Than 50 Percent of the Votes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gathered in Tirana on 23-24 March 1996, the Socialist Party [PS] Second Congress, having analyzed the party's four-year journey since the First Congress, discussed and defined its main objectives for the imminent parliamentary elections, its strategy and tactics for winning these elections, its electoral platform for the 1996 People's Assembly, and the candidates it will propose as deputies.

Reiterating the PS's clear dissociation from the past, from the policies, organizations, and practices of the party-state and from communism and totalitarianism;

Analyzing the processes of policymaking, organization, and reform in the PS and its contribution as a constructive political force in opposition;

Denouncing the slanders, continual diversions, and the unprincipled war that the Democratic Party [PD] government has unleashed against the PS, which culminated in the arrest and arbitrary imprisonment of the party chairman, the deputy Fatos Nano;

Realistically considering the current political situation, the progress of democratic processes with its achievements and failures, the detours and distortions on this road caused by the consistent strategy of tension mainly devised and employed by the head of state;

Considering the forthcoming parliamentary elections to be a decisive constitutional step in extracting the country from its crisis;

Considering its alternatives, its aims, and its ways and means to realize these purposes that have been carefully determined by the relevant committees and widely discussed in the party and among experts;

Realistically taking stock of its advantages and the difficulties it must confront in the forthcoming electoral campaign;

And being aware of its responsibility to the country and of its own role in political life today and in the future and of its duties to the electorate that supports it and to the entire nation, the PS Second Congress has reached the following main conclusions:

1. The political statements of the PS's most senior forums and all its stands dissociating the party from the practices and ideology of the party-state and Enver Hoxha's dictatorship have been clear, unequivocal, convincing, and correct. The PS has unambiguously condemned the communist regime and its political, economic, and social methods, the savage class war, the extreme disrespect shown to human rights and freedoms, and the isolation of the country. The PS's position on totalitarianism is expressed in its modern social democratic program and is evident in all its political activities and practices.

2. All the PS's work during its four years in opposition has realistically embodied the objectives of its program. The PS has made its mark on the public at home and abroad as a political force with a clear social democratic physiognomy and vision, with indisputable authority among the Albanian electorate, which has made an important contribution to establishing, protecting, and consolidating the rule of law, and which has assumed the initiative and taken a primary role in protecting human rights and freedoms, in the social protection of marginalized groups, in the defense of the national cause, and in a realistic assessment of the values and distortions of distant and recent Albanian history.

3. Organization, wisdom, and a cool head have been the weapons with which the PS has confronted the unprincipled, savage, and incessant attacks and slanders of the ruling party and the president of the republic. The PS has used all democratic ways and means to denounce the arbitrary arrest and groundless conviction of Party Chairman Fatos Nano, which involved flagrant violations of procedure. The Albanian public and the most prestigious international institutions have demanded the release of Fatos Nano. Adopting a balanced and correct standpoint, and using a strategy of dismantling step by step the PD's strategy of tension, the PS has succeeded in taking the political initiative, seriously and responsibly preparing itself to assume the government of the country and to enter the election campaign with unshakeable confidence in victory. We say "no" to political revenge. Our motto is "Let us look ahead!"

The PS is aware of the opportunity offered by the imminent parliamentary elections for the fate of democracy and the country, and is prepared to overcome any obstacle, pressure, and manipulation by the PD-state before and during the election campaign. It therefore calls on all opposition political forces to commit themselves, regardless of differences in their programs, to the fair conduct of the ballot and to respect for the people's political will.

The conduct of free, fair, and democratic elections is our immediate objective in overcoming the political crisis and the collapse of the economy.

5. The PS is seriously prepared to assume power and to govern the country in a new way. It proposes to the electorate its own alternative that guarantees new developments in Albanian democracy and that realistically expands the opportunities for employment, property ownership, stable economic growth, and social solidarity, which will permit the complex development of production, improved infrastructure, and better rural living standards. It will look to the future and increase its investment in human beings. It will make a priority of defending and solving the national question and will aim at hastening Albania's integration in euro-atlantic structures.

6. The PS's basic objective in the 1996 electoral campaign is: Achieving political victory in the new general elections with more than 50 percent of the votes in order to form a successful and stable government for the country and to fulfill the Albanians' aspirations for genuine democracy and prosperity. Its message to the Albanian electorate in these elections is: "Together with us for genuine democracy. We will win!"

Having conducted its proceedings according to the agenda, the PS Second Congress has decided:

1. To approve the report of the PS General Management Committee, "A New Role for the PS in the Country's Life," delivered by Comrade Servet Pellumbi.

2. To approve the PS's electoral platform for the 1996 parliamentary elections.

3. To approve candidates for People's Assembly deputies. The congress appoints the PS Presidium and the General Management Committee to allocate candidates to constituencies, as soon as the latter have been legally defined.

4. To approve the resolution "On the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms."

5. To approve the PS Electoral Commission for the 1996 election campaign.

6. To approve "The Electoral Message of the PS."

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Bulgaria: Defense Minister Views Dialogue With NATO

AU2703143496 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 22 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by Stoyan Petrov: "Military Wages To Be Increased by 10 Percent on 1 April"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with the Council of Ministers' decree on compensating state employees for inflation, the wages of the military will be increased by 10 percent as of 1 April, Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov informed the Council of Ministers on 21 March.

The minister said that all documents related to the Russian shipment of 100 T-72 tanks have been signed, and the routes of their transfer to Bulgaria have been agreed upon. He expects the tanks to arrive in Bulgaria in April. However, the precise date of arrival depends on the pace of processing the documents and of transportation. The minister of defense expects an additional shipment of military equipment soon. Talks are being conducted on this matter with Ukraine and Belarus.

Asked by a correspondent whether he is aware of the fact that, on 20 March, U.S. Secretary of State Christopher did not mention Bulgaria as an eventual NATO member, Minister Pavlov answered that he is aware of this statement. According to him, this could be either an accident or a certain assessment. We have no evidence regarding a negative attitude or suspicion toward Bulgaria, Minister Pavlov said. We declared that we will participate seriously in the intensified dialogue with NATO. We have prepared a document on this matter, which will be discussed soon by the Council of Ministers. It clearly reflects Bulgaria's position and the interest it has in this dialogue, Defense Minister Pavlov stressed in conclusion.

Bulgaria: Commentary Urges Decision on Joining NATO

AU2703175496 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 27 Mar 96 p 9

[Commentary by Georgi Traykov: "Sofia, Rather Than Brussels or Moscow, Should Decide About NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the new Bulgarian custom, our politicians tell us their thoughts from abroad. The contents of their thoughts indicats who is visiting the West and who is visiting the East.

On Annunciation Day, Dr. Zhelev's message came from Brussels that only NATO membership will guarantee our country's national security. According to him, only a close cooperation with the European and Atlantic structures could guarantee the irreversible character of the reforms in our country. Regardless of whether one agrees or not, the president's position is a consistent, clear, and frank one. We missed the unique opportunity to categorically demonstrate a pro-European orientation at the birth of the Bulgarian democracy. Now Dr. Zhelev understands that this is the last chance to finally part with our past and justify our geographic identity as Europeans.

The approach of the executive power and the Bulgarian Socialist Party is wrapped in vague formulations. When its representatives visit Moscow, except for some academic blunders, we usually hear the dry and laconic "we expressed our well-known position." However, this position is probably known to a narrow circle of people, regardless of whether they consist of the prime minister's friends or not. So far, no cabinet member has clearly said "yes" or "no" to NATO. There is nothing horrible about conducting a dialogue on a vitally important issue for our national security. The endless and deliberately meaningless sentences at least show that the people with the real power in their hands are perhaps against the Atlantic idea, but, for the time being, they prefer to wait. Thus they assume the risk of being accused of borrowing the call for "lowering the profile" that was issued during the period of Gorbachev's perestroyka.

The logical place of every European state is in the Eurostructures and their security systems—NATO, the Western European Union, and so forth. Any other behavior would be strange, and we could hardly afford it. By this, I mean, for example, Bulgaria being in the EU and having military treaties with Moscow, Beijing, or the African Francophone states. In other words, if someone is against the European security system, he should spell out his arguments. However, he should not repeat the old threat that "Moscow will turn our tap off." Every NATO member state maintains good economic relations with Russia. Absolutely nothing could prevent Bulgaria from having economic ties with Moscow or even strengthening them. What sober-thinking politician in our country or Russia would object to having economic contacts? The fact that such contacts were not discontinued despite the chaos in recent years and the hysterical appeals "to sentence the USSR" is proof of their vitality.

NATO's eastward expansion depresses and isolates Moscow by depriving it of a big arms market and objectively and obviously disturbs it. A small state like Bulgaria, even dressed in an Atlantic tailcoat, would feel itself uncomfortable being so close to the border of a powerful military country like Russia. However, would Bulgaria feel more comfortable if it became a buffer zone between the NATO and Russian missiles?

Would it feel better in the twilight zone in front of the worldwide, creeping Islam fundamentalism?

The answers to those questions must be sought in Sofia, regardless of the fact that we are viewed at NATO headquarters as "outsiders," while Moscow praises us for "our position that is close to the Russian." If the politicians cannot reach a consensus, then the people must have their say through a referendum. According to recent polls, more than 50 percent of Bulgarians support our country's membership of NATO.

Bulgaria: BSP Said To Organize Anti-NATO Talks

AU2803124696 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 25 Mar 96 p 3

[Commentary by Nedko Petrov: "'Positano' Instigates Constituency Against NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A circular letter sent by No. 20 Positano Street [Bulgarian Socialist Party—BSP headquarters] will activate next week the red constituency by urging BSP supporters to hold "spontaneous" and "nationally responsible" gatherings of interest clubs throughout the country with an agenda of only one item: No to Bulgaria's membership in NATO. In addition to the "double-entry bookkeeping" of Videnov's cabinet on the issue of NATO, the socialist strategists have also envisaged broad people's "discussions" on one of the most fateful selections in our history—should we join the real democracies and become a normal state, or should we commit ourselves again and for centuries to the Kremlin's "sun and air" [reference to a statement by former communist leader Georgi Dimitrov in 1947 linking the importance of friendship with the USSR to that of air and sun for the human body]. The comrades have even prepared a standard lecture "for" the good Moscow and "against" the bad NATO. This is a situation which resembles a priest hearing confession from a prostitute at the start of her work week. The lecturers will stick to 15-20 strategic points against the "bad" NATO, the most important being: the existence of quarrels between NATO member states; mutual territorial claims between NATO member states; doubts, even on the part of NATO member states, over the leading role of the U.S. in the alliance; NATO's inability to prevent the occupation of the territory of a sovereign member state by another member state; the cost of the standardization and maintenance of our Armed Forces if Bulgaria joins NATO; membership in NATO is not the only alternative and guarantee of our national security—the importance of the neutrality variant—and so forth.

If our society has not sufficiently analyzed and commented on those points we would bother to answer each of them again, despite the fact that each could be the topic of a separate study. A real national discussion cannot be a staged one. With the same responsibility and seriousness, the comrades could also organize discussions on topics such as: why and toward whom should we be neutral since we have been attached to Moscow by an uncut umbilical cord for 50 years; why is the constituency being activated just now, when the grain crisis is around the corner, the banks are facing bankruptcy, the savings of millions of people are being plundered, prices are increasing, and so forth.

There are more such questions, which the last Bulgarian to switch off the country's light could probably answer.

Bulgaria: All Balkan States Agree to Balkan Sofia Meeting

AU2703143296 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] All Balkan states have agreed to take part in the 28 March Sofia meeting of experts from their foreign ministries, Panteley Karasimeonov, Foreign Ministry spokesman, announced at a briefing today.

Slovenia will probably participate as an observer. The goal of the meeting is to discuss the issues that can be included in the agenda of the meeting envisaged for June of the Balkan foreign ministers. This forum was proposed by Bulgaria, and supported by Romania and Greece at the Varna meeting.

Bulgaria: Videnov Views Coming Presidential Election

AU2703174396 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 27 Mar 96 p 9

[Interview with Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov by Sevda Dinovska; place and date not given: "I Increasingly Distrust Sociology"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dinovska] Mr. Videnov, are you not concerned at the fact that the delay in nominating the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] candidate for the post of president could repeat the situation with Sofia's municipal elections, which the left lost?

[Videnov] The municipal elections in Sofia were unsuccessful because of the unfortunate selection of the candidate for the post of mayor by the BSP Sofia City Council. The candidacy was a controversial one from the very beginning. It did not receive the necessary support from the BSP Sofia City Council and, in addition, the insufficiently strong positions of the left in Sofia did not help either. I would not make any comparison between the election of the Sofia mayor and the presidential elections.

[Dinovska] Could you say something about your preferences regarding the presidential candidate of the leftist forces?

[Videnov] I am reading many volumes of sociology books, and I mistrust sociology more and more. When I completely stop believing sociology, I will form my preferences.

[Dinovska] Three months ago, we asked you how you saw the possibility of a cabinet member becoming a presidential candidate. Then, you said "remember your question and ask it again at the end of March." I repeat the question because we are now at the end of March.

[Videnov] I promise not to make any cabinet changes that could compromise the presidential candidacy of a current or future member. This is what I can say specifically now. More details... at the end of March.

Bulgaria: Cost, Bids for Modernizing Kozloduy Reactors

AU2703162596 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Siemens and [?Framaton] have expressed their readiness to cooperate in the coming modernization of the fifth and sixth reactors of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant.

The National Electricity Companies forecasts a budget of $250 million for the modernization of the reactors.

The company which will carry out the modernization will be determined through a tender. So far, 14 companies have declared interest in the tender.

Czech Republic: Havel Urges Firmness From West Over NATO

MS2803095496 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 28 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Kevin Done and Vincent Boland, incorporating interview with Czech president Vaclav Havel; place and date of interview not given]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Growing Russian opposition to the enlargement of NATO has been encouraged by the west's hesitancy about admitting new members from central and east Europe, according to the Czech president, Mr Vaclav Havel. Western leaders should be "firm" in the face of Russian objections, he said in an interview, and should proceed with producing a timetable for enlarging the alliance.

The Russian move to oppose the eastward expansion of NATO was a "fairly recent" phenomenon, Mr Havel said. "Western caution has been interpreted (in Moscow) as a sign that certain remains of interest spheres, or an invisible iron curtain, are still there, and this has stimulated Russian interest in this matter."

While proceeding with a speedy enlargement of NATO, the west should work to build a partnership between NATO and Russia, said President Havel. But it should also "explain to the Russians time and again that such a partnership is only sensible and thinkable if it is a partnership between two entities that do not interfere in one another's internal affairs".

Candidates for NATO membership in central Europe have become concerned that strong Russian opposition may discourage the western alliance from admitting them. Such fears do not appear to have been allayed by the affirmation of US commitment to NATO expansion delivered by Mr Warren Christopher, US secretary of state, in Prague last week.

Mr Christopher said enlargement was "on track and it will happen". NATO would not "keep the new democracies in the waiting room forever".

The Czech Republic has been forging closer relations with Poland in recent months, in an effort to ensure that it is in the front rank of central European countries to be admitted to NATO.

Mr Christopher said enlargement would "naturally begin with the strongest candidates", but the goal was not to let these nations "escape from central and eastern Europe at the expense of their neighbours. Those who are first have an obligation to ensure their membership keeps the door open for others".

Mr Havel called for a redefinition of NATO "now that the threat of communist expansion is gone", and called for it to chart a timetable for enlargement at the planned meeting of the alliance in December.

On the domestic front, Mr Havel said the Czech general election, due at the end of May, would be symbolic as the first to be held "without the revolutionary or post-revolutionary elements" that had held since the collapse of communism at the end of 1989.

"We now have a stabilised spectrum of political parties with their different platforms, so these are going to be real elections rather than elections that resembled referendums, as was the case before."

The most recent opinion polls suggest that the present centre-right coalition, which is led by the Civic Democratic party of the prime minister, Mr Vaclav Klaus, will remain in office, possibly with an increased majority.

The Czech Republic is virtually the only country in central Europe where voters are not expected to choose a government led by former Communist parties, as has already happened in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria.

President Havel said the Social Democrats, the main opposition party, were "still experiencing some growing pains" and needed time to develop. Many Czechs believed, however, that "we should have a valid Social Democratic party as an alternative to the more right of centre parts of our political spectrum".

Czech Republic: Survey Shows Rise in Support for Government

AU2703180596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 26 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by "(jik)": "Confidence in the Government Has Gone Up, and Now More Than Half of the Public Trusts It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The government has gained more supporters recently and now enjoys the confidence of more than half of society. The latest survey by the Institute for Public Opinion Research [IVVM] has revealed that the number of people who trust the current government has gone up by 5.0 percent since February. The government is now trusted by 55 percent of the public.

IVVM Directress Eliska Rendlova was yesterday unable to give a categorical explanation for this rise in support. "Nothing is observable from the polls that could be associated with this," she said. "Despite this, I think the public is reacting to the relatively low rate of inflation in February. That can be the only reason, although I have nothing on which to base it."

Rendlova maintains that, at times when the prices of various products go up and thus inflation also increases,

people's confidence in the government declines. When prices stabilize and inflation does not go up, confidence in the Cabinet again increases.

At the beginning of March, the Institute recorded a slight fall in the number of people who support President Vaclav Havel. It has now established in a survey that 77 percent have confidence in him, while it was 80 percent in February. On the other hand, the Center for Empirical Research, which published the results of its March survey last week, has ascertained the greatest amount of support for Havel to date—79 percent. It was 76 percent in February.

"In our opinion, the president received the most support in February just after his wife died and people wanted to support him," says Rendlova. At the moment, according to her, his popularity is returning to its normal level.

The March survey has again confirmed that the least popular institution is parliament, which is trusted by only 31 percent of respondents.

Czech Republic: Fivefold Rise in Racially Motivated Crime

AU2703131596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 23 Mar 96 p 3

[Report by "(boh)": "There Were About Five Times More Racially Motivated Crimes Last Year Than the Previous Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brno—According to a report submitted by the most senior state attorney, Bohumira Kopecna, the State Attorney's Office dealt with more than 300 racially motivated crimes last year; this is roughly five times more than the previous year.

Verbal attacks in particular prevail among racially motivated crimes. Cases in which people were suspected of making racial slurs increased the most.

"More than 100 people were indicted and charged with making racial slurs last year, while there were roughly 40 such cases in 1994," said Bohumira Kopecna.

According to Kopecna, 12 people were charged with inflicting bodily harm for racial or ethnic reasons; only three people were charged with this offense the year before last.

Most racial crimes were committed in the Breclav and Chomutov Districts, where there are sizable Romany communities. According to the most senior state attorney, friction between Romanies and skinheads occurs most frequently.

Kopecna said that state attorneys started to take a greater interest in racially motivated crime last year. "However, investigators still have a tendency to view such conduct as hooliganism or bodily harm. I think that, in clear-cut cases, the racial motive should be disclosed as soon as the investigation begins," she said.

Slovakia: FM Expects 'Positive' Hungarian Response to Treaty

AU2703184396 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 27 Mar 96 p 1

[Correspondent's report on ratification of the Hungarian-Slovak Basic Treaty by the Slovak Government, including statement made by Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Shenk: "Bratislava Yes for the Basic Treaty"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] MAGYAR HIRLAP asked Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk about the reactions he expects from the Hungarian side in connection with the Slovak parliament decision. Juraj Schenk told us the following: "I cannot imagine any other reaction but a positive one. We have always stressed that we are striving for good-neighborly relations, and this formal act has now crowned our common endeavor to settle the Slovak-Hungarian relations. Therefore, I think that, inasmuch as we take into consideration the opinion of politicians who think rationally, the Hungarian reaction must be favorable. Any negative reaction would express the unfulfilled desires of the extremists, rather than political rationalism." [passage omitted]

Slovakia: Hungarians Expect Help in Implementing Treaty

LD2703202296 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1700 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Last night, the Slovak parliament, parallel with the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty, adopted a statement that excludes the recognition of collective rights for minorities and autonomy demands on the basis of ethnic origin. Although the addendum does not change the points of the basic treaty, it makes it possible to interpret them according to the needs of Slovak internal politics. This prompted the ethnic Hungarian deputies to abstain from voting last night. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Miklos Duray, Coexistence Party chairman] Our stance is still the same—namely, that, with the ratification of the basic treaty, a situation arose in Slovakia that is completely in contradiction with the spirit of the basic treaty. Unfortunately, it has to be said that it will be impossible to implement the basic treaty in Slovakia, and our situation has deteriorated at great speed due to the dispute on the basic treaty.

The Hungarian Government should definitely take on a protective power status [vedoehatalmi statusz] over the ethnic Hungarians of Slovakia. In practice, this means that the representative of the Hungarian Government should act at every international forum, in every international organization, including the Council of Europe, the EU, NATO, and other international organizations, in such a way that he would at the same time represent the ethnic Hungarians of Slovakia because the Slovak Government treats us in a completely hostile manner.

[Bela Bugar, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement] Naturally, I expect that the Hungarian Government, primarily the Foreign Ministry, will take steps. When the two ratification documents are exchanged, the Hungarian Government should ask whether the Slovak Government will implement the whole of the basic treaty or only a few parts of it. This should be the first step the Hungarian Government takes. Then a joint committee must be set up to monitor the implementation of the contents of the basic treaty.

[Laszlo Nagy, chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party] The interpretation document worsens the chances of the implementation in Slovakia, but I would like to repeat that, because this is an international document, international law does not accept this interpretation as a legal document, so the international forums and the signatories of the treaty, in this case the Hungarian Government, can exert pressure on the Slovak side to implement the contents of the treaty. Its chances in Slovakia have worsened, but I do not find the situation hopeless. [end recording]

Slovakia: HZDS 6th Assembly Delegates Issue Statement

AU2703181596 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 25 Mar 96 p 2

["Statement Issued by the Delegates to the 6th HZDS Republic Assembly" in Zvolen on 24 March]

[FBIS Translated Text] The delegates to the 6th Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Republic Assembly have confirmed that the movement, during the five years of its existence, has taken advantage of the scope created by the democratic revolution to establish Slovak statehood and to forge a specific Slovak path for modernizing society.

The HZDS has repeatedly won the citizens' greatest trust in this quest. The forces of inertia, however, constantly dictate a policy of confrontation, and, by internationalizing domestic political disputes, try to offset their poor domestic support with external pressure.

The assembly supported the policy unification of society based on state interests and creating a broad platform for cooperation. In this context, it rejected the attempts to foist early elections on society.

Our young state is suffering greatly under the attempts to establish alternative centers of power. The assembly rejected the head of state's partisan interference in political life.

The assembly confirmed the HZDS's orientation toward becoming a broad-center movement with respect for the principles of democracy, humanism, and Christianity.

The assembly endorsed the improvement in relations with all countries and Slovakia's European and transatlantic orientation. It emphasized that the movement recognizes minority rights but rejects any form of irredentism.

The delegates to the assembly accepted the blueprint for the policy prospects for the years 1996-97 and supported the draft economic strategy up to the year 2020, whose objective is to create and guarantee the conditions for a decent life for citizens in a prosperous, democratic, and free society.

Zvolen, 24 March 1996

Slovakia: Meciar Assesses HZDS Assembly in Zvolen

AU2703205996 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 22 Mar 96 pp 1, 3

[Interview with HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar by Jozef Kroslak; place and date not given: "V. Meciar: The President Is Not Able To Step Over His Own Shadow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The delegates at the Sixth Republican Assembly of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] adopted several important decisions. The movement is in transition to a period of preparing a new program for the development of society. HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar commented on the most important issues.

[Kroslak] The assembly decided to call the next assembly after only two years. Is it a manifestation of a certain unity within the movement or did something else lead you to this step?

[Meciar] The movement matured in terms of the program. The situation has also stabilized in the fundamental personnel issues, which is evidenced by the fact that, in the voting, each of the new executives received at least 200 of the available 223 delegate votes. Our election program has been prepared for four years, and after the 1998 elections, we will probably decide on transforming our movement into a party. Within the next two months, regional and district secretariats will be set up and operating according to the new territorial arrangement. Thus, the stabilization of the lower elements was the reason for starting to contemplate the next assembly only after two years.

[Kroslak] Could you sum up the most important results of the meeting?

[Meciar] The assembly can be considered important from several viewpoints. First of all, we have checked the execution of the tasks from the Slovak Government policy and learned that more than half the tasks have been done. At the same time, we laid the foundations for the program of the development of society until 2015 or 2020, wherein scientific and technological solutions are expected to become the main element of the progress towards modern technologies. From the international point of view, we are launching the process of the orientation of the citizens towards accepting entry into the international organizations. The development of HZDS assemblies has been very interesting. The first was public and, except for ourselves and a few reporters, no one attended it. The second, under the conditions of the approaching partition of the state, was almost clandestine. The third took place in an atmosphere of anxiety prior to the departure of the Knazkoites, the fourth was shortly after we left the government, and many people expected that it would be the end of us. At the assembly in 1995, we received several courtesy visits by diplomats, and now, this time, the attendance of diplomatic representatives and those of several foreign political parties was exemplary. In the political sphere, I would like to point out an important appeal of the assembly addressed to all parties in society. There has been enough polarization and confrontation—it is time to start cooperation. We are going to see whether this appeal will be accepted.

[Kroslak] Did you discuss the problems with the president?

[Meciar] The public has not yet been thoroughly acquainted with the context of the events of 1994. We know, however, who financed the entire operation. An independent body is investigating the entire matter. March 1994 had been prepared for a long time with numerous entities—including the president—participating. The HZDS Deputies' Club was subverted from without rather than from within. This is known, and the public will soon learn these facts, and who was behind it. Regarding the president, our society must not count on an accord between our supreme constitutional entities for another 23 months because the president is simply unable to overstep his own shadow. The struggle of the president against the movement has lasted since March 1993, and that is really a long time. If he wants to be nonpartisan, he should alter his stand with respect to us, and not the other way around.

[Kroslak] You are proposing a change of the electoral law. What leads you to such a step?

[Meciar] There are several imperfections in the electoral law. The bodies being elected also do the monitoring, for instance, which should be done by an independent court. It is necessary to alter the institution of election ballots and deal with other technical problems, so that what the Democratic Union did in the last elections cannot be repeated. The process of unification of large and small parties began on our political scene because the new electoral law could disadvantage them. We would welcome a second strong political entity on our political scene. However, the wards cannot be identical to those in the current territorial arrangement, and therefore special ones will be created.

Slovakia: Meciar Explains Decision Not To Propose New Envoy

AU2703194096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 25 Mar 96 p 1

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Juraj Hrabko; place and date not given: "The Government Prefers Not To Risk Further Problems"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The government no longer intends to propose to the president anyone as a candidate for the post of ambassador of the Slovak Republic.

[Hrabko] You said that the dispute between the supreme state bodies would continue for another 23 months. Are you convinced that this is to Slovakia's benefit?

[Meciar] I have been thinking from the very beginning that it was not. But are we supposed to take another risk and repeat what did not help us this time, with a government minister and Movement [for a Democratic Slovakia] deputy chairwoman, a person on whose international acceptance we had been working for over a year, whom we would not have proposed had she not had an over 90 percent chance of becoming UN envoy? I would not send away a government minister to become ambassador if I did not have a very high degree of certainty that she would be successful in that job. This is yet another negative signal to the public, and also abroad. Why should we take the risk and select further people, expose them to scandalization, compromise them on an international scale, and collect more bad points for the Slovak Republic?

[Hrabko] You did not know in advance that the president did not intend to nominate Olga Keltosova as ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the United Nations?

[Meciar] Certainly not. I did not know it. It did not even occur to me that the situation might arise that Minister Keltosova would not be appointed because we were working with her systematically, both as a personality and in the UN. I let the president know in the spring of1995 that we would be working on this, and all this time I did not receive any negative signals. The government prefers not to risk any further problems.

Slovakia: Bishops Fear Installation of 'Totalitarianism'

AU2703170796 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 26 Mar 96 pp 1-2

[Commentary by SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA Chief Editor Jan Smolec including "a substantial part" of of a statement issued by "some Slovak bishops": "Totalitarianism Is Supposedly Being Installed in Our Country; Some Bishops Are Concerned"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Yesterday, we received by fax from Peter Fidermak, secretary of the Slovak Bishops Conference [KBS], a statement issued by some Slovak bishops against the government bill that changes and amends the Penal Code. We publish a substantial part of this tendentious and unobjective statement.

"Three years ago we embarked with great hope upon the path of our own statehood. Our hope sprung from the certainty that we have a strong spiritual and physical potential in the gift of faith, in the Cyril-Methodian tradition, in spiritual culture, in respect for life and man, and, furthermore, in the determination to create in the heart of Europe a state built upon law and justice, upon moral and ethic foundations. All the greater is our disappointment when parliament passes laws that are at odds with these principles and, what is more, run directly counter to them. We have received with great concern and anxiety the government-sponsored National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] bill of 8 March 1996 that changes and amends the Penal Code. The bill includes Articles 91 to 98 that are comparable with Law No. 231 of 1948, on the basis of which hundreds of thousands of innocent people were sentenced, imprisoned, persecuted, and even tortured to death. The most dangerous are Articles 92 a) and 92 b), in which it is stated: 'One who with the intention of subverting the constitutional system....'

"We are asking: How can an intention be proven? By force, perhaps? This is, after all, what happened at all the staged trials in the fifties! We see in a bill conceived in this fashion a great deal of latitude for its misuse. This makes us immensely anxious because it might lead to the installation of a totalitarian regime.

"We are therefore appealing to you, esteemed deputies, and declare:

"a) By passing this bill, particularly Articles 91 through 98, which are comparable with Law No. 231 of 1948,

you will assume responsibility before God, the nation, and all of history for all crimes that might be committed in the future on the basis of this law.

"b) The passage of this bill will give rise to the danger of a new totalitarianism being installed in our republic. This bill can become a disgrace to our state before the whole world public. Thereby, you would actually be inflicting the greatest damage on the interests of the Slovak Republic.

"We are also appealing to the Police Corps and to the prosecutors and judges of the Slovak Republic:

"a) By applying this bill, the Police Corps, prosecutors, and judges would join the ranks of the criminals of totalitarianism who had caused moral and physical harm to hundreds of thousands of innocent Slovaks. Here, we have to call attention to the Nuremberg trials, at which the police, prosecutors, and judges were invoking valid laws of the [German] Reich, according to which they were trying people and meting out sentences. At that time, the Nuremberg court clearly ruled: The state's executive bodies must not apply an unjust and cruel law even if they were to suffer severe physical or financial damage as a result thereof. If they do apply such a law, they are co-responsible for the committed crimes.

"b) The loss of independence is inadmissible for the Police Corps and the judiciary. This state of affairs lasted in our country for 40 years when the Police Corps and the judiciary were an instrument of one political party and, under its pressure, had to trample their own conscience underfoot. It seems that, even today, we are incapable of getting rid of this problem.

"We are appealing to you, dear believers, irrespective of nationality, and declare:

"We are sons of our nation and state. We are faithful to God, the Church, and the teachings of Jesus Christ. We honor the dignity, freedom, and conscience of every man. We are on the side of law, justice, and truth. In the name of our calling and mission, we want to be always on the side of the oppressed, socially weak, and persecuted. We are calling upon you not to let yourselves be misled by the ideology of power, false prophets, the ideology of liberalism and materialism, the vision of quick wealth, nor by ideological currents claiming that man can do anything he wants. The most important thing for man is to do what is morally good, just, and serves the common well-being. We are believers together with you and we are your bishops (cf St. Augustine)."

The statement was signed by:

Monsignor Alojz Tkac, metropolitan, in own hand

Monsignor Rudolf Balaz, bishop of Banska Bystrica, in own hand

Monsignor Frantisek Tondra, bishop of Spis, in own hand

Monsignor Eduard Kojnok, bishop of Roznava, in own hand

Monsignor Peter Dubovsky, suffragan bishop of Banska Bystrica, in own hand

Monsignor Bernard Bober, suffragan bishop of Kosice, in own hand

Monsignor Andrej Imrich, suffragan bishop of Spis, in own hand

Monsignor Milan Chautur, suffragan bishop of Presov, in own hand

Chief editor's note: Do Bishops Have No Faith in the Slovak Republic?

I do not have room for a more detailed reaction. The time of a newspaper page going to press is inexorable. After reading the above statement, many believers will surely wring their hands and lift their eyes to the skies with the words: "God, protect us from such bishops!"

Fortunately, I did not discover among the signatures the name of metropolitan Archbishop Jan Sokol and, above all, the name of Slovakia's holy man, Cardinal Jan Chryzostom Korec, former political prisoner tortured under totalitarianism. Perhaps these church dignitaries did not sign because they have faith in the young, democratic Slovak Republic. They have faith in its sovereignty and also in the politicians who run it, because these politicians initiated the return of property to the churches. Everything suggests that the undersigned bishops do not have faith in this government. It is their business and also their right. But we who drew up the blueprint for Slovak independence and also realized it successfully must insist on our fear for the fate of Slovak statehood—from Hungarian irredentism, for example—not being associated with the communist totalitarian regime. The Penal Code amendment will not be a disgrace because Slovakia already has firm barriers that will not permit the return of totalitarianism. Incidentally, one of these barriers is the father bishops themselves, who will always find room for their statements, also on the pages of our daily. But let them be so kind as to allow us to openly deliver our opinion on their frequently unfortunate statements.

Slovakia: Church Official on Bishops' Statement

AU2803163396 Bratislava SME in Slovak 27 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by "klo": "Bishops' Statement Is Not Politicking"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banska Bystrica—Monsignor Rudolf Balaz, chairman of the Slovak Bishops Conference and bishop of Banska Bystrica diocese, expressed his position on the government-proposed law that changes and amends the Penal Code by his signature under the Slovak bishops' statement, which is why he deems it unnecessary to comment on his attitude. According to Jozef Hrtus, director of the Banska Bystrica Bishop's Office, "the bishops' statement is not politicking, but an expression of concern about the nation and fundamental human rights in it. Bishops should always be shepherds in the proper sense of the word, even if that means accepting losing. They used to express their opinion in the past, too, though, perhaps, not loudly enough. At hindsight it is to be seen, however, that this [meekness] was harmful." Asked by SME why the signatures of some Slovak bishops are missing under the statement, Jozef Hrtus stated: "Not all the bishops have signed because they could not be reached. We suppose that, even though the Penal Code amendment has meanwhile been passed, they will still join their colleagues' statement. At this moment, their voice is no longer required. If they do not sign, it is proof of democracy within the Church."

Slovakia: Parliament Vote on Antisubversion Legislation

AU2803123996 Bratislava SME in Slovak 27 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by "jo": "Ivan Gasparovic Again Abstained"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The final vote on the draft amendment to the Penal Code was attended by 140 deputies. The draft was endorsed by 77 coalition deputies, while 57 opposition deputies voted against. Ivan Gasparovic (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]), chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], and Deputy Marian Polak, of the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], abstained. Four deputies—Marta Aibekova, Jan Fekete, Arpad Tarnoczy (all HZDS), and Jozef Moravcik (Democratic Union)—did not participate in the vote. All 10 deputies who were not present were opposition deputies. (Editorial note: The NRSR chairman presented himself yesterday, once again, as one of the few professionals among coalition deputies when, during the vote, he reiterated his proven course of action from the parliamentary night of 3-4 November 1994, when he did not endorse two deputies-sponsored bills: on the abolition of Moravcik government's privatization decisions, which the Constitutional Court subsequently termed anticonstitutional, and on the transfer of jurisdiction from the government to the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic, on [the constitutionality of] which the Constitutional Court is yet to rule.)

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 27 March on page 2 carries a 200-word report by Martin Kovacic and Zita Sujova entitled "Deputies on Penal Code Amendment," which includes the following passage: "The only HZDS deputy who did not vote for the Penal Code amendment was NRSR Chairman Ivan Gasparovic. Asked by the NARODNA OBRODA correspondent why he abstained during the vote, Ivan Gasparovic only made a dismissive hand movement, turned around, and left without a word."]

Slovakia: Minister Appoints Members of Language Council

AU2703182896 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 22 Mar 96 p 2

[TASR report: "Central Language Council Was Established"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, Slovak Culture Minister Ivan Hudec appointed members of the Central Language Council (UJR) and gave them their letters of accreditation. The newly appointed members are Jan Dorula, Jan Kacala, Milan Majtan, Ivan Masar, Jozef Mistrik, Jozef Mlacek, Simon Ondrus, Maria Pisarcikova, Matej Povazaj, Ivan Ripka, and Jan Sobol. The mission of the UJR is to propose measures for observing the Law on the State Language of the Slovak Republic, make suggestions for the protection and scholarly research of the Slovak language and its dialects, and evaluate proposals to change the form of the state language. It will be the role of the council to provide an expert opinion on controversial issues concerning the state language usage, follow the work of the terminological commissions in the individual central bodies of state administration, and guide the work of language advisers.

Slovakia: Jews Concerned About Anti-Semitism

AU2803150196 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 26 Mar 96 p 3

[Report by "ao": "Concern Over Matica's Activities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—In a statement issued yesterday, the Central Union of Jewish Religious Communities [UZ ZNO] in the Slovak Republic reacts to events associated with the glorification of the wartime

Slovak State. It finds striking, above all, the fact that Matica Slovenska [Slovak Heritage Foundation], an organization enjoying great financial and moral support of Slovak state bodies, including the Ministry of Culture, is traditionally among the chief organizers of these events. One of the parties of the present government coalition, the Slovak National Party, too, openly identifies with a positive evaluation of the Ludakist regime. The document notes with concern that articles and speeches demanding the rehabilitation of representatives of Slovak fascism, anti-Semitic articles, and the labeling of journalists of Jewish origin as anti-Slovak elements are appearing in a number of periodicals. The UZ ZNO appeals to all responsible bodies to react actively and in time to the attempts to rehabilitate the fascist regime and its protagonists. At the same time, it joins the statement of several civic associations demanding that the controversial Penal Code amendment be withdrawn from Parliament's agenda.

Slovakia: Dispute With Hungary Over Impact of Danube Dam

AU2803165696 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 26 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by "da": "Tedious Talks on Hydroelectric Project"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gabcikovo—Talks between Dominik Kocinger, Slovak Government commissioner for the construction and operation of the system of hydroelectric power projects on the Danube, and Arpad Kovacs, his Hungarian counterpart, ended without any striking results in Gabcikovo yesterday. The subject of the talks was the assessment and comparison of the results of monitoring the environmental impact of the hydroelectric power project. Under an agreement of 19 April 1995, the environmental impact is being monitored in both states. Both sides' experts drew up so-called national reports (which Hungary submitted with a three-week delay), on the basis of which a joint report for the Slovak and Hungarian governments is to be worked out. Coming to an agreement will not be easy, however, because the experts were unable to agree on the time frame that the monitoring should encompass. Neither side calls in question the other side's results from measuring the level of underground and surface waters, the condition of forests, and other environmental impacts of the project, but they differ on the methodology of approaching the ascertained values. Dominik Koncinger said that although Hungary is unable to prove the negative impact of the project, it frequently proclaims it, assuming, apparently, that this will improve the country's image prior to the proceedings before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. He added that the Slovak side is making available to the Hungarian experts and to the court in The Hague all documentation, because we have nothing to be ashamed of and nothing to hide. The talks will continue, probably before the end of this month.

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Hungary: Horn Comments on Hungarian-Slovak Basic Treaty

LD2703180296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian political parties have reacted strongly to the news of the ratification of the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty in Bratislava last night or, more precisely, to the Slovak parliament's decision that not one line of the document can be interpreted on the basis of the principle of collective minority rights. This means that there is no chance for any kind of minority autonomy in Slovakia, says the Slovak parliament in the two addenda to the basic document. Our reporter Laszlo Gardai asked Prime Minister Gyula Horn to give his views on yesterday's decision.

[begin recording] [Gardai] What is your reaction to the fact that the ratification has finally taken place?

[Horn] I welcome the fact. It is a serious step forward, and it may close a stage. We based Hungarian-Slovak relations on foundations that are in line with European norms and requirements. This also helps in the development in bilateral relations, since despite the tensions there is a certain kind of relation building, I am referring to the economic sphere, the opening of border crossing stations, or joint participation in privatization, cultural relations. Serious developments have taken place in the past two years.

However, a whole series of minority problems are still causing tension between the two countries. I very much hope that even with the extra interpretation added to the basic treaty by the Slovak parliament, or despite it, the violation of the rights of the ethnic Hungarians there will not continue. On the other hand, we will hold talks, since the two parties have taken on a kind of obligation to this effect, in order to settle the disputed questions in the spirit of the basic treaty. Thus, despite everything this is very important for both countries, and also for the security, cooperation, and peace of the region. [end recording]

Hungary: Bratislava Reports Ministry Comments on Treaty

LD2703121696 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0600 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Hungarian side hopes that the ratification of the Basic Treaty will result in the expansion of mutual relations and impart a new impetus to our cooperation. This what Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gabor Szentivanyi told our Budapest correspondent Gregor Martin Papucsek.

[Papucsek] In connection with the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty yesterday, Gabor Szentivanyi said, among other things, in the telephone interview for Slovak radio last night:

[Begin Szentivanyi recording—in Hungarian with superimposed Slovak translation] What I welcome is the fact that, following [word indistinct] delays and internal political discussions, the National Council of the Slovak Republic has ratified the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty.

We believe that the Treaty, signed by both prime ministers last year, contains a mutually acceptably wording of the interests of the two countries and peoples. We believe that it can be a good basis for historical reconciliation and for the creation of friendly and goodneighborly relations, and that, last but not least, it can provide a positive solution to the position of minorities living in the two countries.

On our part, we are striving to solve existing problems in keeping with our countries' orientation towards European and Atlantic structures by means of conducting direct talks (?and we would like to see) the speediest possible implementation of the Basic Treaty. We believe that now that it has been ratified, there will be no more obstacles barring its implementation. We shall put into effect our own measures promoting the implementation of the Basic Treaty.

[Papucsek] The spokesman will comment on the National Council's special resolution only after he has studied its text. [passage omitted]

Szentivanyi expressed the hope that the Basic Treaty, which has been ratified by both sides, would give a new impetus to our relations. Gregor Martin Papucsek, Slovak radio Budapest.

Hungary: Legal Experts Assess Treaty With Slovakia

AU2703182796 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 27 Mar 96 p 9

[Correspondent's report: "Experts Say It Is Legal Absurdity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the basic rules in international law is that there can be no reservations and remarks in bilateral treaties, the legal experts of the Hungarian Justice Ministry told NEPSZAVA. We asked them about the extent to which it is customary to do what Bratislava has been urging lately. According to the Slovaks, it is possible to add remarks to a treaty that has already been ratified by the other side.

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According to the experts, the concept of the Slovak side totally contradicts international legal practice. Legally, the content of a treaty is obligatory. If, nevertheless, either side sticks to its desire to deviate from the original text, there is no other solution but further negotiations. In addition, the country that has already ratified the agreement can also exercise pressure on the partner country at various international forums.

However, in the case of tripartite or multiparty agreements, it is customary to interpret certain stipulations and to express reservations. Therefore, in the case of multiparty agreements, the sides occasionally stipulate that remarks cannot be made and reservations cannot be added to the document in question.

Hungary: Opposition Objects to Addenda to Slovak Treaty

LD2703140496 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [FIDESZ-MPP] and the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP] fear the Hungarian Foreign Ministry will not react to the two addenda to the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty; although, the two addenda do not make practically any kind of minority autonomy possible.

The Smallholders said that, if the clauses were maintained, they would propose to revise the basic treaty.

The Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] thinks that we should not allow the addenda to be treated as parts of the treaty when the documents are exchanged, because they seriously threaten the collective rights of the Hungarian community of Slovakia.

Andras Kelemen, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], described the Slovak step as unfriendly, but said that the basic treaty should not be rejected.

According to Tamas Katona of the Hungarian Democratic People's Party [MDNP], the Slovaks' dissenting opinion could be expected, but the ratification applies only to the basic treaty and not the addenda, which are not part of the agreement.

Hungary: Parliament Debates 'Gypsy Question'

LD2703150496 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In his contribution to the parliamentary debate on the Gypsy question, Prime Minister Gyula Horn said that improving the life of Gypsies is a national issue. Responding to criticism by the opposition about government delays, the prime minister said that, contrary to the previous government, this government had approved a comprehensive Gypsy program.

Csaba Tabajdi, the keynote speaker of the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] thought that the Romanies' problems can only be treated in the context of majority and minority.

This was disputed by Jozsef Torgyan, who described the Gypsies as a part of the Hungarian nation's body [magyar nemzettest]. According to the Smallholders' leader, this is the only correct approach to the solution of the Romany issue.

The minister of culture and education urged setting up projects to improve the situation of the Gypsy community. Balint Magyar urged that an increasing number of Romany teachers should be trained, projects for helping Gypsy pupils in completing primary education should be prepared, and colleges for nurturing gifted students should also be established.

In his contribution to the debate, Jenoe Kaltenbach, minority ombudsman, reported that, following certain complaints, sometimes even his contribution was not enough to achieve significant progress.

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B-H: Serb Daily: Mujahidins Planning Attacks on IFOR

AU2703154696 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 27 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by M. Kovacevic: "Rewards of Up to $50,000 Per Head"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If the plans of the government in Sarajevo and the Arab fanatics, predominantly the nationals of Iran and Algeria, who have remained in Bosnia after the Dayton accords under the pretext of marriages or in other ways, come true, the fragile peace in the region will not last for long. They have been given orders to prepare a spring offensive against the Implementation Force [IFOR] that is supposed to be carried out mostly on Serb territory, in order to invoke the international community's memories of the Markale market and Vase Miskina Street massacres.

According to reliable information, as soon as the demarcation line is cleared of mines, groups of three to four mujahidins will penetrate deep into Serb territory and begin attacks on IFOR soldiers, particularly the Americans. They plan to plant mines on roads along which IFOR troops are moving, but also to carry out direct attacks on their commands.

The terrorist groups are well equipped to survive for a long time in hostile territory, and none of the terrorists must be captured alive by the enemy, says the order they have received. In the case of possible capture, however, they are supposed to commit suicide by, say, activating an explosive device sewn into their clothing. Those who perform their task successfully can count on high financial rewards; the reward for killing U.S. soldiers ranging from $5,000 to $50,000 per head, depending on the victim's rank.

The goal is clear. All such terrorist actions would be ascribed to the Serbs, and the reaction of the international community and IFOR's retaliation would also be directed against the Serbs. This is supposed to contribute to the dissolution of the Serb ethnic entity in Bosnia, and of course, to cause the disintegration of the Serb Republic. Besides, it is also clear that such a plan leads solely and exclusively to the renewal of war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Box, p 2]

The public will undoubtedly learn about atrocities committed by mujahidins in Bosnia, but even now it is beyond question that they were the main organizers of arms and ammunition smuggling, which they frequently carried out in cooperation with certain UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] members. General Michael Rose was the only person who understood what was going on and tried to prevent it. Because of this, and his public statements at the time of the crisis in Gorazde in April 1994, two attempts at his assassination, which luckily failed, were organized.

In both cases Iranian nationals were involved.

[Box, p 2]

It is now beyond any doubt that the massacres of civilians in Sarajevo's Vase Miskina Street and at the Markale market were organized precisely by Arab holy warriors who were specially trained for terrorist actions. While committing atrocities, they used special devices that, according to their own accounts, had been used in Lebanon as well.

On the roofs of houses, the terrorists installed special devices similar to mortars with a spring, which they used to launch 120-mm or 80-mm caliber shells. The device's mechanism is quite simple: The tube is firmly fixed to a base with a spring.

To make sure that a shell will eventually explode, the terrorists replace the original charge with a plastic explosive substance with a fuse and a detonator. Before launching a shell, the slow-burning fuse is lit and the shell is launched.

There is no detonation at the launch site, while the shell's flight is almost completely soundless.

B-H: Serb Daily Sees Bosnia's 'Choice' of Iran or U.S.

AU2703195996 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 23-24 Mar 96 p 4

[Commentary by Dragan Marcetic: "Alija Between Tehran and Washington"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbs' exodus from Sarajevo has given the last and final blow to the insane vision of some multiethnic and multireligious union of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After that exodus, no reasonable person will be able to believe in it. At the same time, what few remaining links used to exist between the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation have been terminated, which, had they remained, could have caused many troubles for the Serb Republic.

All in all, the end of the Serb exodus from Sarajevo has marked, at least for the time being, the definitive division of former Bosnia-Herzegovina in two entities, namely, the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation. Thus the Muslim-Croat federation and the problems with its federal units (Alija's [Izetbegovic]

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jamahiriyah and Herzeg-Bosnia) have come to light before the world public in their full size, weight, and insolubility.

Things could not have been any different, because there are no longer any Serbs at whose expense they could be settling their own problems. Now, in Sarajevo, the same situation as the one that has been in Mostar for a long time will come about. In this case, the prospects of the Croats are much more unfavorable, although one should not underestimate them, because, with the Croats, surprises are always possible. Despite all this, one should not fool oneself that the Muslim-Croat federation will leave the Serb Republic alone just like that and end the attempts to use it as a disguise for its own difficulties and problems. In that sense, the sick old man, not the one on the (?Bosporus) but the one in Sarajevo, is already announcing openly that the Serb entity will not be recognized if elections are not conducted in the Serb Republic and that the so-called Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the would-be army of the union, will intervene against the Serb Republic if the Serbs are dissatisfied with the international arbitrage on Brcko.

It is not clear who gave him [Izetbegovic] the right and what kind of union he is talking about, as nothing like that exists in Bosnia-Herzegovina yet, but it is quite clear how his army would fare if it happened to attack the Posavina corridor. Several days ago, I finished an analysis of the successes and failures of Alija's army in the past war, and came to interesting conclusions. In the entire past war, from 4 April 1992 until 5 October 1995, the day when the latest ceasefire came into effect, which is altogether 43 months, Alija's mujahidins, without Croat and NATO help, did not inflict a single defeat on the Army of the Serb Republic in terms of strategy or operative actions. The only success of that army at the time involved combat and struggle (tactics) alone, when part of Mount Ozren (Vozuce) was occupied. An aggression of Alija's mujahidin army against the Serbian Posavina corridor could be seen as an operative action, so, in view of their war experience so far, its outcome, if the attack happens, is known in advance.

Necessary Conditions

Although aware that the federation, as the basis of the Dayton accords, is not viable, the West is trying to maintain it at any cost. The failure of that Washington-Vienna creation would mean the division of former Bosnia-Herzegovina not into two, but into three parts, which the West does not want and cannot imagine happening. After unpleasant experiences with Alija and his obstruction of the Dayton accord, the West has most probably assessed that the best solution would still be if the Croatian checkered flag covered the whole of former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Alija's jamahiriyah is increasingly strengthening its ties with Iran, both secretly and publicly, as well as with other militant Islamic countries. These ties actually mean the creation of an Islamic fundamentalist state or center of Islamic terrorism in the south of Europe. Initially, that fundamentalism would pose a danger for the Serb Republic and Herzeg-Bosnia, then for the FRY and Croatia, and finally for Europe as well. No matter how much the United States wants an unstable Europe, they want the supremacy of Islamic fundamentalism in it even less. Therefore, after all the mistakes made in former Bosnia-Herzegovina by sustaining Islamic fundamentalism and after having recognized this, the West has thought up a new "cunning" plan for the region, the realization of which is neither simple nor easy.

In the first phase of the revised plan for the establishment of a new order in the region, the Serb Republic is supposed to be eliminated, either through its peaceful reintegration into the constitutional-legal system of the union or through occupation. For such a thing, one should create all the necessary conditions during the presence of the Implementation Force [IFOR] in the region, so that the implementation of the plan can start immediately upon its departure. The second phase anticipates efforts to settle problems between the federal partners in the Muslim-Croat federation, in which the Muslims would not stand a chance of survival. The real indicator and confirmation of such Western intentions is the persistent endeavor on the part of Americans to provide Alija's army with arms and training, for the sake of some military balance in the region. The EU, particularly Great Britain and France, are struggling feverishly against such U.S. intentions, because they know all too well where it all will lead. Croatia, through the agency of its defense minister, even announces an intervention against Alija's state if the arming of his army continues. It is certain that the Croats do not fear his mujahidin army, but it would be better to prevent any conflict in order to make their job easier later. After all, it is clear not only to them, but also to any reasonable man, that the arming of Alija's mujahidins in the middle of the peace process in former Bosnia-Herzegovina can only trigger a new war. As for the military balance in this region, which Americans keep using as a pretext, for they do not have any better one, a normal question is what it is all about. Or, to put it this way: What military balance is it all about when the Dayton accord has established such a great military imbalance in the region, which can only be made even greater by delivering arms to Alija's mujahidins? According to the Dayton accord (Annex 1-B, Agreement on Regional Stabilization, Ar-

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ticle 4, Sections 3 and 4, and particularly according to Paragraph e) it is unambiguously stated that if the parties (the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation) fail to reach an agreement by 14 June 1996, a provision will be applied according to which "the approved holdings for Bosnia-Herzegovina will be divided among the entities based on the proportion two for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to one for the Serb Republic."

Arbitrage

Since the agreement will not be reached, that is for sure, this means that the Muslim-Croat federation, starting from 14 June this year, will have 50 percent more manpower and armament within its armed forces than the Serb Republic's army. Let us remember that on 14 June this year at the earliest the international arbitrage for Brcko is supposed to begin, and also that this is the initial date for the beginning of elections in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. In such conditions, in order to considerably improve the quality of the arms and training of Alija's army, according to the magazine U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, the Americans are planning within the operation Equip and Train to furnish Alija's army with arms and equipment worth around $850 million. The shipment involves 40 tanks, 80 armored personnel carriers, 2,550 trucks, 144 artillery pieces of 75-mm to 155-mm caliber, 318 antitank weapons, 20 helicopters, and 170 surface-to-air missile systems.

In addition, the shipment of a large of radio and telecommunication devices has also been anticipated. Everything can be bought for money save the heart and soul, which the Americans will discover only when it is too late. The only condition that the Americans are insisting on is that Alija should make it clear whether he is for Washington or for Tehran.

Mujahidins

Imported mujahidins, particularly those from Iran, are a nightmare for the United States and its staff in the region. The Americans know all too well that Iran has been training several hundred of Alija's mujahidins, but also that several mujahidin training centers exist in his jamahiriyah. The leader of the Algerian mujahidin group based in Zenica, Abu Salim, stated publicly some time ago: "We did not come here only to leave as soon as the Americans arrive. We are living in a time when Islam will prevail. Bosnia is a Muslim country, and we have to defend it." Iran is the only Islamic country that sent a regular army unit to Bosnia, namely, the 7th Brigade of the Revolutionary Guard numbering 2,000 men, the headquarters of which used to be based in Zenica. Some other mujahidin groups, like The Guerrilla and The Green Legion, also used to be stationed in Zenica. A unit called Muderis was based in Konjic, the Al Mujak unit was based in Tesanj, while The Black Swans unit was stationed in Kakanj, a unit that took part in operations on Mount Vlasic. Other centers for the training of mujahidins were based in Mehuric village near Busovaca, in Pazaric near Sarajevo, and Bistricak village north of Zenica.

Some time ago, around 40 terrorists, members of the secret Islamic fundamentalist organization called The Muslim Brotherhood, arrived from Egypt. Despite the Dayton accord, according to which those men were supposed to leave Alija's jamahiriyah, many of them have remained like Muslim priests, teachers, craftsmen, or diplomats. It is obvious that Izetbegovic will have a difficult choice when deciding between Washington or Tehran. In view of what he has said and done so far, his choice is both Washington and Tehran, which will not go down well with the Americans.

At the time of this ostensible peace, the Serb Republic is facing many challenges and dangers. On 20 April this year, the Army of Serb Republic is to withdraw to its barracks or locations designated by the responsible commander of IFOR. The surplus of men will be demobilized, and they will hand over their arms and equipment. On 14 June, the Dayton restrictions on manpower in the armed forces of the entities (for the Army of Serb Republic this means 12,500 men, 158 tanks, etc.) and other military equipment will come into force. On that day at the earliest, elections are supposed to start in former Bosnia-Herzegovina and even in the Serb Republic, but also the arbitrage at Brcko. The dissolution of the phantom Muslim-Croat federation is in progress and cannot be halted, while there will be a new armed conflict between the Croats and the Muslims in a matter of days.

B-H: UN Blasts Federation Police for Cutting IPTF Ties

AU2703141596 Paris AFP in English 1246 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 27 (AFP)—The United Nations blasted the Moslem-Croat federation police Wednesday [27 March] for withdrawing cooperation with its police monitors in a Sarajevo suburb.

"In Ilidza, the federation police have practically stopped all cooperation with the UN police (IPTF)," said IPTF spokesman Alexander Ivanko.

"(They) are refusing to allow all UN monitors into their operations room, refusing to provide any information on patrols or any arrests or detentions made," Ivanko said.

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Under Bosnia's Dayton peace agreement, the IPTF is tasked with monitoring the work of local police forces throughout the country. The UN police however, have concentrated their efforts recently in areas of Sarajevo transferred from Bosnian Serb control to that of the federation.

In Ilidza, relations between the UN and the federation police have been bad from the start, Ivanko said.

The spokesman said the only reason given to the United Nations for "such flagrant noncooperation" is "orders from above."

Ivanko said the UN police commissioner "reminds the federation authorities that such a lack of cooperation on the part of the federation police is in violation of the...Dayton peace agreement."

B-H: Minister Accuses IFOR of Causing Serious Pollution

LD2703185796 Mostar Radio-Televizija Mostar Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ahmed Smajic, minister of agriculture, forestry, and water management in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Government, has said that there are indications that the Implementation Force [IFOR] has been discharging dangerous waste material, perhaps even nuclear waste, in the Igman and Bjelasnica areas.

He suspects that the new mountains of earth formed by the international community—and during this process, it destroyed the Veliko Polje plateau on Igman—conceal dangerous materials.

Minister Smajic has accused IFOR members of vandalism in cutting down trees and of a negligent attitude toward the natural heritage and environment of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He said that all the harmful material from this waste dump seeps down through the ground and gets into Sarajevo's drinking water.

B-H: Silajdzic Says Izetbegovic Not Opposing Division

AU2803103496 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 2100 GMT 27 Mar 96

[Report by Friedrich Orter, including statements by former Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic in Sarajevo; date not given—recorded; Silajdzic statements in English with superimposed German translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Orter] In one of these two shelled office towers on Sarajevo's ill-famed former Sniper's Alley, Bosnia's former government head is planning his political comeback. His declared objective is to save Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state. It is here that Haris Silajdzic has set up his office. His party will officially register at the beginning of April. The name of the party is its program: The Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the Dayton accord, one part of the country looks much more like Croatia and not Bosnia, Silajdzic says.

[Silajdzic] The war is over. How can we tolerate that? Moreover, the other half of Bosnia looks more like Serbia. In practice, those who want to divide Bosnia have been rewarded. The region will not be stable until we solve this problem. As long as the international community tolerates that and joins this campaign of silence, we will have new problems.

[Orter] Silajdzic accuses Izetbegovic and his government of not opposing this development and doing nothing against the division of Bosnia. For the former founding member of the all-powerful state party, the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], the Bosnian Muslims constitute the most important factor of integration. However, they have fallen into a deadly trap—exactly where their enemies wanted them. The reproach of fundamentalism has turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy, Silajdzic says.

[Silajdzic] My party is a party of the democratic center. People are tired of all the extremists. The people in Bosnia want peace and a normal life. We want to be part of democratic Europe.

[Orter] This also includes freedom of the press. Boycotted by state television, Silajdzic is banking on Studio 99, which has taken a critical position towards the government, to reach the people.

Yet, Studio 99 Director Adil Kulenovic remains realistic. At the moment, independent media are nothing but islands in an independent Bosnia, more of a government instrument than a real factor of democracy, he says. Particularly also because they are limited to small areas. Studio 99, for example, can also be received in Sarajevo.

The question remains how regular elections can be held in a country where approximately half of the population have been expelled and only some of them can or want to return before election day in September.

B-H: Silajdzic Says Federation 'Exists Only on Paper'

AU2803140896 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 27 Mar 96 p 2

[Interview with former Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Sabine Riedel in Sarajevo; date not given: "'Federation on Paper Only'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Riedel] Mr. Silajdzic, why have you left the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]?

[Silajdzic] I left the SDA two years ago. I withdrew from the party's executive committee back then. That committee is government, presidium, and parliament, all in one. All the decisions are made there. There is only one single opinion allowed in the party. Generals and police representatives interfere with politics; anyone who wants to become director of a company has to be a member of the SDA. The SDA seemed increasingly like the old Communist Party to me.

[Riedel] Why did you not establish your own party at an earlier point?

[Silajdzic] There was a war going on. During a war all the forces should be combined with the single aim of defending the country.

[Riedel] Why should the people in Bosnia vote for Haris Silajdzic's party?

[Silajdzic] The most important thing is Bosnia-Herzegovina's unity, which is at risk. Bosnia-Herzegovina is being divided into three parts, ethnically homogenous territories are being created. The logical consequence of that is the division of Bosnia. My party will be active in all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I know that there are also Serbs and Croats in this country, to whom Bosnia means home.

[Riedel] You were a member of the Bosnian delegation at the Dayton talks. Has the Dayton agreement not sanctioned this homogenization?

[Silajdzic] The Dayton agreement also offers a chance. It contains elements that promote disintegration, but it also contains opportunities for reintegration. The thing is that these opportunities are not being used. The agreement's first priority is an undivided, sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. The internal border is mentioned only after that. Yet, this issue has moved to the foreground. Nobody talks about the outer, international borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Riedel] How do you see the role of the federation?

[Silajdzic] The federation exists only on paper. Two years after the Washington agreement was signed it is obvious that those whom this federation affects do not want it. What we actually have in Bosnia is an expanded Croatia. They can call it Herceg-Bosna or a part of Bosnia, the truth is that it is Croatia. We have an expanded Croatia and an expanded Serbia. And now there are also some Bosniaks who say: Perhaps we should rather have a small state for the Muslims alone.

[Riedel] Does that mean that there will be no stable peace as long as the regimes in Zagreb and Belgrade are stable, or as long as the international community respects them?

[Silajdzic] The community is, of course, glad that Bosnia has disappeared from their television screens. Unless we protest, we will see Bosnia silently disappearing.

[Riedel] During the war you were the most prominent supporter of a multiethnic Bosnia. That is why one would have expected you and the Bosnian Government to react to the events in the Sarajevo suburbs after they were handed over to the Federation. International Police Force and IFOR [Implementation Force] representatives have repeatedly reported that Serbs, who wanted to stay after the Grbavica and Ilidza districts were handed back, were beaten and threatened by returning Bosniaks, and their apartments were ransacked. According to IFOR, the Federation police looked on and even encouraged the attackers. The government did not utter a word about these incidents. How does this go with the commitment to a multiethnic society?

[Silajdzic] What you have just said is new to me. But if it is true, this means that we are imitating the fascists. And that means that we will not exist much longer. The world would not accept a Muslim state, let alone a Muslim-fascist one.

[Riedel] You said that your party's first priority is the country's unity. What other positions does your party hold?

[Silajdzic] Unity is what is at risk at the moment. We need a secure framework first; then we can go about reorganizing the country. That means that the army and the police must keep out of politics. There will be no foreign investment as long as we do not have a rule-of-law state, as long as people are the law and the law does not have enough weight. And we must have full autonomy for the religions.

[Riedel] How will you pay for your election campaign?

[Silajdzic] I do not know. But I know for sure that I will not accept any assistance from abroad. At the moment we are a very poor party. You should see my Volkswagen. It is 20 years old.

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[Riedel] Will there be any television duels with your major opponents?

[Silajdzic] You are thinking of an election campaign as they are conducted in the West. You must not forget that in this country a state television station is not the same as a state television station in any country in the West. Those in charge have not even given me broadcasting time to explain to the people why I was not prepared to take on government responsibility again. Mind you, at that time I was still prime minister; and that is what they call state television. That is not a state-owned broadcasting station, nor is it a station that belongs to a party, it simply belongs to a couple of people.

[Riedel] In Germany there is a debate going on as to when the 300,000 refugees should be sent back to Bosnia. One argument for their speedy return is that it is time that these people help with the reconstruction of their country.

[Silajdzic] I think that we must first create the preconditions for their return. If they return now they will compete for apartments and the few jobs there are with those who were expelled within the country. This would lead to tensions, which could result in political radicalization. I am aware of the situation in Germany. But as far as the refugees are concerned, we should not allow these people having to suffer a second time.

B-H: Muratovic Views HVO-Controlled Areas in Federation

AU2803171696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 28 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Commenting on the concern that NATO Secretary General Javier Solana expressed regarding the latest events in the Federation, Republican Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic said the following in Sarajevo today:

Not a single law of the Federation or the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been implemented on the territory controlled by the Croatian Defense Council [HVO]. If war profiteers and war criminals are not (?eliminated), it will be difficult to bring the Federation together, Prime Minister Muratovic added.

B-H: Pejanovic Discusses Elections With EU Peace Monitors

AU2703145796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and president of the Serb Civic Council, today received a delegation of the EU peace monitors led by (Peter Wallis), head of the British mission in the EU. The meeting was also attended by the heads of the monitoring missions of the Netherlands, Greece, and the Czech Republic.

They discussed the current events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the conditions that need to be secured for the forthcoming elections to be concluded successfully. Special attention was paid to the freedom of the media and how to enable Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees to vote, considering that almost half of the electorate is in exile.

As Pejanovic said, the Serb Civic Council should participate in the forthcoming elections through civic, democratically oriented parties. There is also a possibility of the council taking direct part in the elections.

B-H: IFOR Permits Army, HVO To Enter Disputed Barracks

AU2703165896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] IFOR [Implementation Force] has issued instructions to the commanders of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croat Defense Council [HVO] on the deployment of troops in the areas in which there was a (?change) of authority west of Sarajevo, IFOR spokesman Major Simon Haselock said at a news conference in Sarajevo today.

He said that Generals Rasim Delic and Zivko Budimir had demanded access to the barracks in Butile and Blazuj. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has started (?moving into) the Butile barracks as the D+90 deadline has expired. However, according to the orders of Gen. Michael Walker, further deployment in the barracks is not allowed, Haselock said.

The letter of instructions that was sent by Gen. Walker to both the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO states that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army may be allowed to enter the barracks in Butile at 1200 tomorrow, Haselock said.

He said that [words indistinct] the buildings in the Blazuj, which are in fact not barracks, [words indistinct] by both the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO, cannot be used for military purposes. Haselock stressed that the buildings in Blazuj will be made available to the federal army, which is in the process of being set up, and that [words indistinct] the joint command will be allowed to move into Blazuj. He said that this deployment will be done under IFOR supervision.

Haselock said that the redeployment of the army of the Serb entity in the Mrkonjic Grad area, where there had

also been a transfer of authority, is going without any problems.

B-H: Bosniaks Assaulted in Brcko Separation Zone

AU2703211196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Mar 96

[Report by Amir Hadzovic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Residents of the free Brcko territory have once again had firsthand experience of the violation of the Dayton agreement by the Serb entity. In the zone of separation, which is supposed to be protected by IFOR [Implementation Force], during a visit to their homes, a group of Bosniaks was beaten up by [word indistinct] special force. Amir Hadzovic has the details.

[Hadzovic] [Words indistinct] mainly women and children intended to visit their burned down homes yesterday noon in the zone of separation [words indistinct]. As witnesses say, five cars suddenly came from the direction of the town. From them emerged [word indistinct] special force armed with wooden sticks and karate [word indistinct] and without saying anything singled out five men and started to beat them ferociously with these objects. Two of the five men from Brcko who set off to visit their homes managed to save themselves by running away. The other three men were caused serious bodily harm. [passage omitted]

B-H: Brcko, IFOR Officials To Discuss Brcko Incident

LD2703234596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On the approaches to Brcko, in a zone which is supposed to be protected by the Implementation Force [IFOR], a group of Bosniaks who had set out to visit their homes were beaten up by members of the army of the Serb entity.

Five cars appeared in front of the approximately 30 people, mainly women and children from [word indistinct] Brcko. Soldiers armed with wooden staves got out of the cars, separated five males from the group, and began to beat them up.

What IFOR did at this juncture can be gleaned from the fact that IFOR soldiers took one of those who was beaten up to Brcko hospital so he could get medical treatment. Afterwards he was taken back to free territory.

As a result of this incident, the Brcko public security station has sent an official protest to IFOR. The matter is supposed to be discussed at tomorrow's talks between Munever Jusupovic, head of the Brcko municipality, and Colonel (George Fontenay), commander of IFOR forces in this area.

B-H: Bosniaks Leave Capljina Council Session in Protest

AU2703200696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Mar 96

[Report by Mirsad Behram]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Capljina Transitional Municipal Council today held a session in Capljina. The work of the session could be assessed as partly successful. After the deputies had agreed on the first two points of the agenda, problems arose with the election of the council's chairman. This lead to the Bosniak deputies walking out from the session. Mirsad Behram reports.

[Behram] At the beginning of the session, the participants approved the mandate of all deputies of the Capljina Transitional Communal Council. After that, they proceeded with the election of the Capljina representatives to the Neretva Canton parliament, as the Bosniak deputies told us, and elected five deputies to the cantonal parliament. Here is what Himzo Saric, head of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] deputy caucus, told us about that:

[Saric] Of these, three are from the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], one from the SDA, and one from the SDP [Social Democratic Party]. The fifth deputy is also a Croat. So, the national composition of the deputies from Capljina for the cantonal parliament is four Croats and one Bosniak.

[Behram] The deputies then proceeded with the election of the chairman of the Transitional Municipal Council and the head of Capljina municipality. On the basis of the decision of the arbiter for Bosnia-Herzegovina on Capljina, the Bosniak representatives proposed that a Bosniak be elected chairman of the council. Moreover, as we have learned from the Bosniak representatives, this proposal was based on the fact that there is a similar ratio of deputies in Konjic municipality, where the Bosniaks constitute the majority but have enabled a Croat to be elected chairman of the transitional municipal council. Here is what Ismet Leto, one of the SDA deputies from Capljina, told us.

[Leto] We expected the Croat side to accept our proposal that a Bosniak be elected chairman of the council. However, after the commission for appointments and dismissals made its proposal, the deputies proceed with voting, which ended as follows: 12 deputies voted for a Bosniak to be elected chairman, 29 were against, and three abstained. After that, a new chairman from the

SDA ranks was proposed. The voting was very similar. In the second round of voting, 12 deputies voted for, 27 against, and four abstained.

[Behram] This was a reason for the Bosniak deputies to walk out from the session of the transitional municipal council of Capljina since the agreement reached in Capljina three days ago, that a Bosniak be elected chairman, was not respected. [passage omitted]

B-H: Muslim Official on SDA Boycott of Stolac Meeting

LD2703195296 Mostar Radio-Televizija Mostar Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The president of the Stolac municipality, who was elected to this post in the first multiparty elections in 1991, has convened, without consulting the Bosniak side, a constituent session of the Stolac interim municipal council. An explanation of why he did not go to this unilaterally convened meeting has been given to us by Tahir Djulic, a member of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] executive committee:

[Begin Djulic recording] SDA deputies and some of the Bosniak deputies who are members of the Social-Democratic Party [SDP] did not go to today's meeting convened by Mr. Zeljko Ragus, the municipal president, because no agreement had been reached on the convening of this meeting.

We, representatives of the SDA and representatives of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ], had a meeting in Stolac on 23 March, which was also attended by Mr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling, the international mediator, and we were unable to reach agreement on some very vital and important issues connected with the work and operation of the interim municipal council.

On 5 December, together with the HDZ, we drew up an agenda with a view to setting up an interim municipal council. Now, on the basis of some views expressed by Mr. Schwarz-Schilling, this agenda has been completely altered, and, as a result of some other solutions being put forward regarding the acceptance of regulations governing the work of the federation's parliament, the two sides have not been treated equally.

[Unidentified correspondent] So the SDA believes there should be no changes to what has already been agreed?

[Djulic] Yes. [end recording] [passage omitted]

B-H: Bildt Meets With Serb Negotiator on E. Slavonia

LD2803160796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1455 GMT 28 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Erdut, 28 Mar (TANJUG)—Carl Bildt, the High Representative of the international community, said in Erdut [eastern Slavonia] today that he is convinced that there is a desire on the Serbian and Croatian side to see that the provisions of the Erdut Agreement are implemented in full.

After talks with Milan Milanovic, head of the Serb delegation in the talks with Croatia, Bildt added that he believes that the mass emigration of Serbs as happened in Serb Sarajevo will not be repeated in the Srem-Baranja region "because the transitional period here is longer and the UN forces are a combination of military and civilian personnel."

Bildt said it is very important that "the Serbs, Croats, and others continue to live together; this will have a positive impact on peace not only in the area of former Yugoslavia but also throughout Europe."

According to Milanovic, he and Bildt agreed that the situation in the Srem-Baranja region is more stable than in Sarajevo.

Milanovic confirmed the readiness of the Serb side to respect the Erdut Agreement, and he warned of the need for the international community to demand this of Croatia as well. [passage omitted]

B-H: Karadzic Congratulates Milosevic on Serbia Statehood Day

LD2703182796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1601 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 27 Mar (TANJUG)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, today sent his congratulations on the occasion of statehood day to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, saying that "an undivided and strong Serbia is a guarantee of security not only for the people of Serbia and us, the other Serbs, but for the entire region of south Europe."

"On behalf of the leadership and people of the Serb Republic I would like to congratulate you personally and the whole Serbian people on the state anniversary that marks the constitutional strengthening of Serbia's unity. The importance of Serbia's strength will be even more obvious in times to come. This event has dispelled fears—felt by us who remain outside Serbia—that the same fate will befall Serbia that befell other states that were destroyed," the letter says.

"We would like to assure you that our basic goal is to develop the strongest possible links with Serbia and Yugoslavia, and therefore we expect a speedy improvement of all our ties and relations. All the help Serbia and Yugoslavia have already offered has strengthened our belief that we are one people and that it will never be otherwise."

"This is why I would like to express to you not only my greetings, but also the gratitude of the people of the Serb Republic," President Karadzic's letter says.

B-H: Krajisnik Looks Forward to Unity of Serbs

LD2803172096 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 28 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Serb Republic President Dr. Radovan Karadzic yesterday sent a message of congratulations to the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, on the occasion of Statehood Day of the Republic of Serbia on 28 March. Today Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Assembly of the Serb Republic, also congratulated the citizens of Serbia.

[Begin Krajisnik recording] I will be happy when the bridges across the Drina are rebuilt, when the unpleasant memories of the blockade, of western and eastern Serbia [changes thought], and when all this becomes one nation and one entity. At present we have separate state holidays, and we have many things which artificially divide us. I would like on behalf of all citizens to send the citizens on the other side of the Drina this message, that we are celebrating with them the state holiday of our motherland, and if we both press for it, and support and seek a common denominator of unity, we will quickly be united.

All international factors are against the unification of Serbs, but a nation which recognizes that there are no ideological differences, and no territorial, linguistic, or other differences which could be a barrier to the unification of the nation, that nation will some day be united. Such unity should never be seen only in the present context. We have come a long way and I hope that we will in the future perhaps celebrate as statehood day the day when we are united, and our other celebrations and holidays will be a reminder of a time when we were separated and when the embryo of a real Serbian state was formed—I have to be a little subjective—the Serb Republic is after all a Serbian state, and perhaps it is the embryo of a united Serbian state, while the motherland is the magnet which pulls us together, so that we will not separate and go back to the situation we were in before this fatherland war. [end recording]

B-H: Human Rights Commission Officially Inaugurated

AU2703155796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Mar 96

[Report by Senada Cumurovic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Commission for Human Rights of Bosnia-Herzegovina has officially been inaugurated in the Army Hall in Sarajevo today. The commission was founded by the Dayton peace agreement. Senada Cumurovic reports:

[Cumurovic] The Commission for Human Rights of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent institution was established by Annex 6 of the Dayton agreement. Its task is to monitor and (?deal) with the violation of human rights as defined by the European Convention.

The meeting was addressed by Mirko Pejanovic on behalf of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He described today's inauguration of the commission as important for the process of realization of the Dayton peace agreement.

[Begin Pejanovic recording] In the postwar period, the main problem is how to give back the human rights that the citizens have been forcefully deprived of during the war. We are talking about human rights, the safety of property, the freedom of movement, the refugees' right to return, and the right to property.

One should also stress that the Commission for Human Rights is a very important factor and institution in developing the model of protection of human rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Cumurovic] The (?Commission) for Human Rights consists of 14 members, eight elected by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, four by the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and two by the Serb entity.

B-H: Serb Colonel To Be Released to Sarajevo Authorities

LD2703142996 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1354 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 27 Mar (TANJUG)—Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic will be handed back to the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo, Igor Pantelic, Col. Krsmanovic's lawyer, told TANJUG today.

Speaking on the telephone from The Hague, Pantelic said that Graham Blewitt, the Hague tribunal's prosecutor, told him that there is no longer any legal basis for the further detention of the Bosnian Serb army colonel

in The Hague, and that he will be handed back to the judicial bodies of the Muslim-Croat Federation.

Pantelic recalled that the Hague tribunal will announce its official decision on Krsmanovic's status on 29 March.

B-H: Gen Blaskic Not To Surrender to Hague Tribunal

AU2703191796 Paris AFP in English 1900 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] The Hague, March 27 (AFP)—Bosnian Croat General Tihomir Blaskic, indicted for war crimes, will not surrender to the International Criminal Tribunal Friday despite promises to that effect from Croatian leaders, his lawyer said Wednesday.

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman had said at a Bosnian summit in Geneva this month that Blaskic would surrender.

Zvonimir Hodak, the lawyer for Blaskic, met at The Hague Wednesday with Tribunal prosecutor Richard Goldstone and said that despite earlier promises that Blaskic would turn himself in to the court Friday, the surrender could in fact be weeks away.

Hodak was trying to negotiate a house arrest in a hotel for Blaskic, rather than have him held in jail.

Tribunal spokesman Christian Chartier said: "There is no question of welcoming Blaskic as a free man."

Blaskic was indicted along with five other Croats on November 13 for the massacre of 100 Moslem civilians on April 18, 1993 in the village of Ahmici in central Bosnia.

Blaskic, 35, married and the father of two children, was chief of staff for the Bosnian Croat army until the indictment. [passage omitted]

B-H: Reporter Visits Alleged Mass Grave Site in Branjevo

BR2703131696 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 27 Mar 96 p 14

[Report by Vladimiro Odinzov: "Horrors and Mysteries of a Mass Grave"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Branjevo—A field of ocher-colored earth that slopes down toward the banks of the Drina a little over 1 km below, marks the border between the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and that of the Yugoslav Federation. The apparently dry earth proves soft and breaks up into alluvial silt mixed with white and green pebbles as you walk over it.

Two long parallel sheds house pigs, which can be heard grunting in the dark. Beyond there lies what looks like a manor house, empty and silent, but certainly inhabited, judging from the clothes hung out to dry. There is also a long shed to shelter the tractors and bales of hay and a red firefighting tank truck. In the farmyard stands a row of some 20 tractors, with big rear wheels and smaller ones in front.

A little to the right there is a dense thicket of undergrowth, brambles, and still bare saplings, that surrounds the fields in a semicircle. At the edge of the thicket, where a plow has dug a last furrow around it, there can be seen, still stuck in the reddish soil, the white bone of a human arm wrapped in heavy fabric, as though packaged, ending in something that resembles the cuff of a heavy shirt or jacket. The weather has faded the color from the fabric, which appears to be that of a green, red, and brown camouflage uniform.

Further on there is another piece of the same fabric, with more bones and shapeless fragments of flesh grown hard and black, appearing through the cloth. They appear to be two parts of the same body, broken and dragged to different places. It is impossible to identify its nature or origin. It is not "decomposing matter," as Albright's team wrote: It is dry, almost desiccated, compressed, and has no smell.

Behind these remains stands a small reinforced-concrete building, now inaccessible through the thick undergrowth, buried in a hollow, bearing a large notice: "Do Not Approach With Live Flame."

This is Branjevo-Donje Pilica farm, administered by the little village of Janja, which in turn is attached to the regional capital, Zvornik. To reach there we needed permits and authorizations issued first by the Pale government and subsequently passed back and forth between the police forces of Janja and Zvornik, which did not want to be involved directly. From Pale we were escorted by Branko—who charged 100 German marks for the job—and who was joined in Zvornik by another local policeman who was satisfied with lunch in a local restaurant as payment.

This is Branjevo, the last mass grave discovered in Bosnia in the extreme northeast of the country, which according to evidence given by a Serb soldier, contains the remains of a still unspecified number of victims from General Mladic's ethnic cleansing. Last week, the Americans brought Ambassador Madeleine Albright here to give her an opportunity to express her horror at the conflict, confronted by this spectacle of death.

According to the photographs distributed to the press by the U.S. intelligence services, between 5 and 17 July

last year (at the very time of the Srebrenica's fall) large-scale work to move the earth was carried out to level out an embankment and cover up the victims' corpses. In fact, in Branjevo there is no embankment, but a large patch of woodland that still runs through the middle of the fields and has now been leveled to provide more land for cultivation. Judging from the vegetation, the work appears to date from that period.

The ground was then heavily plowed, with furrows 50 cm deep (certainly not to the depth of a mass grave, which would require an excavator), and it was then that the plowshare uncovered the human remains—about which there is no doubt—that are now emerging.

Amid the undergrowth there are rags, not whole items of clothing, and many items of civilian footwear of all kinds—trainers, leather shoes, but never a pair. There is also various garbage—tin cans, scraps of paper, plastic.

The U.S. ambassador was shown a fragment of someone's spine: It is still there, but if it was ever part of a human being, he must have been a giant at least three meters tall. And amid the excavated earth there are many calcified bones, but they are either too large or too small to be human. At the sight of the two dead bodies—though it might only be one—the policeman from Zvornik paled slightly and refused to approach any closer. Then he said, rather uncomfortably: "Farmers in these parts fertilize the soil with animal carcasses and bones," and refused to say anything else the whole time. Later, at lunch, he asked for a Serbian tea—hot eau-de-vie mixed with water and sugar.

There was nobody in the farmhouse, and nobody could, or would, say who lived there and since when. It is a large farm with plenty of machinery and equipment. The land is almost ready for sowing. Was there any fighting in these parts? "No, not here. The front lay yonder, beyond those mountains, past Zvornik. People here never stopped working."

Some 10,500 people lived around Janja. Some 2.1 percent of them were Serbs, 0.2 percent Croats, and 94 percent Muslims. Many of them have gone missing. As you leave the Drina and climb into the forests of eastern Bosnia you traverse a desolate landscape of destroyed homes and dead villages, blown up like the mosque, which looks as though it was crushed by a heavy weight. This was the territory dominated by Seselj's armed gangs of Chetniks who crossed the river from neighboring Yugoslavia in 1993.

Now, after the sensation created by Madeleine Albright, there are no armed guards, policemen, or monitors around Branjevo. Not a single IFOR soldier to prevent interference, attempts to eliminate the evidence of a massacre. And if those really are human remains, nobody has yet thought to provide them with a more humane resting place.

B-H: RS Negotiations 'Under Way' on Body Exchange, Missing

AU2703083796 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Makso Simeunovic, president of the committee for the exchange of prisoners of the Serb Republic [RS] Army's Eastern Bosnian Corps, announced a meeting with the Muslim committee from Celic near Tuzla concerning the handover of the bodies of 42 Serb soldiers. According to him, negotiations with the Croat side about handing over the bodies of three Serb soldiers killed in Posavina are under way.

The committee for the exchange of prisoners of the Eastern Bosnian Corps is looking for 110 persons missing since the fighting on the Glamoc and Mrkonjic Grad fronts. Simeunovic claims that a great number of these are Serb soldiers who are still alive, while IFOR representatives have unofficially confirmed that there are over a hundred unregistered Serb prisoners in the Muslim prison in Bihac.

B-H: Serb Republic Completes Registration of Refugees

AU2703074296 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bogdan Latinovic, deputy minister for refugees and displaced persons, stated today that the registration of refugees and displaced persons has been completed and submitted to the Serb Republic statistical office. The official results on the number of refugees and the property they left behind should be published in early April. Latinovic said that the state authorities will use the relevant information to begin setting up permanent accommodations for the refugees and displaced persons.

Croatia: Foreign Affairs Adviser Examines Priorities

AU2703153296 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 23 Mar 96 pp 12-13

[Interview with Dr. Ivan Simonovic, first assistant to the Croatian foreign minister, by Mate Piskor; place and date not given: "And Now Into Battle for European Union"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The past week, limited at its beginning and end by the meetings in Geneva and Moscow, was exceptionally successful for Croatian diplomacy. Apart from the good results of the aforementioned meetings, Croatia was finally given permission to join the Council of Europe. We spoke about that and subsequent tasks with Dr. Ivan Simonovic, the first assistant to the Croatian foreign minister.

[Piskor] More than six months ago immediately after Operation Storm, you said that 1996 would be the year of the complete reintegration of Croatia into Europe. Now at the end of the first quarter, do you still think the same?

[Simonovic] I am very glad that we are now at the end of March much closer to this, about which I was talking toward the end of August last year. Because the crucial move has been made regarding our admission into the Council of Europe. It is too early for any kind of triumphal behavior, but things are moving in the right direction.

[Piskor] You are referring to the recommendation of the Board for Political Issues for admission of Croatia into the Council of Europe?

[Simonovic] Yes, precisely. It would be unprecedented if the Parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Ministers decided otherwise after the recommendation of the Political Board. Therefore, it is very likely that Croatia will be admitted into the Council of Europe in May.

[Piskor] In May and not in April?

[Simonovic] The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which makes a political decision on admission, will be in session in April. The final decision will be made by the Council of Ministers in May.

[Piskor] That will be the first step. We have a chance to step across that threshold that has kept Croatia in place for a long time. It will be much easier to undertake further activities?

[Simonovic] We are immediately setting off for the next round of our diplomatic battle, which will be easier because we will have one big obstacle behind us. And this second round refers to the European Union.

[Piskor] What are our priorities?

[Simonovic] As far as European integration is concerned, Croatia knows precisely what it wants. We want full membership in the EU. The Council of Europe is only one important station at which we must stop on our way toward it. Simultaneously with the process of being admitted into the Council of Europe, on the wings of the good pro-Croatian atmosphere created in Strasbourg, we intend to resume our talks with the EU about the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program and on the Agreement on Cooperation.

[Piskor] What about Partnership for Peace?

[Simonovic] When we compare the Council of Europe and Partnership for Peace, there are very big similarities. Neither of the two is our final objective, but both of the two are the stages we must go through. Just as our objective in European integration is the EU, so it is our full membership in NATO regarding the security arrangements.

[Piskor] And where are we now regarding that?

[Simonovic] As we have quite an opportunity to join the Council of Europe, so there is a good situation regarding Croatia's joining the Partnership for Peace. However, I have to explain something regarding this. Partnership for Peace in itself is not an organ; it is a program of cooperation with the organs of NATO. It includes various forms of military cooperation, in the shape of joint military exercises, coordinated methodology of military planning, budgetary planning, then the issues of democratic control of the civilian authority over the army, and so on. It is, to make it short, a whole-package arrangement that involves diplomatic and military aspects regarding security and cooperation in that field.

[Piskor] Can you tell us more precisely about when we will join the Partnership for Peace and NATO?

[Simonovic] Regarding European integration and security arrangements, Croatia is lagging behind some other countries like Slovenia or Hungary, but it is not our fault because we were hit by aggression. In a way we are getting back to the point right before our journey was forcefully interrupted. I personally believe that we will compensate for our delay relatively quickly until we reach our final objectives.

[Piskor] Will there also be preconditions set for us, like the list of conditions for admission into the Council of

Europe, on the occasion of our admission into security systems?

[Simonovic] The general principles, like democratic organization and stability, go without saying, however, it is beyond dispute as far as Croatia's participation in Partnership for Peace is concerned. The main problem regarding the accommodation of the countries which participate in Partnership for Peace and NATO is the question of the compatibility of the army organization, of the system of commanding, and finally, the question of armament compatibility. Croatia, which had neither arms nor army at the moment of aggression, has also acquired certain advantages because of the fact that it started to organize army and obtain armament from the very beginning. Because, I repeat, Croatia knew what it wanted from the very beginning, so through the organization of army, arms development, and development of the command system, it had the NATO model in mind. Thus, by its organization, the Croatian Army is more harmonized with the NATO members' structure than most of the countries that have already joined Partnership for Peace.

[Piskor] Let us talk a bit more about admission into the Council of Europe. It has been rather painful for all of us to listen to Europe's persistent refusals to finally accept us. Why did we have to wait so long to get permission? Because of our mistakes or because of the lack of understanding of the situation?

[Simonovic] I would agree with you that we have waited so long, and that we have often been stopped because of wrong appraisals and because of misunderstanding of reality. And our reality is that we were simultaneously experiencing the processes which in themselves are exceptionally painful, hard, and cause big shocks. We were simultaneously creating a state, carrying out the transformation of the political and economic system, and defended ourselves from a brutal aggression. In such circumstances it was extremely difficult to continue our journey toward the planned objective. But we have succeeded in it and this recommendation of the Political Board tells us a lot about it.

[Piskor] If I understand clearly, we are in a way getting back to the beginning, to 1990?

[Simonovic] Now in the stabilization of the political position of the Republic of Croatia, in the wider aspect of the situation calming down in the whole area, Croatia in fact has a new chance to return to the dreams with which it started as a state. And those are, of course, Europe, NATO, the market economy, and a European quality of life.

[Piskor] Which has been crucial to Europe this time to judge and to pass a verdict favorable to us. What was the essential change in the situation?

[Simonovic] I would say that the final decision had mostly to do with the appraisal of the maturity of the Republic of Croatia. Namely, in the Republic of Croatia there is a national consensus of all political factors that Croatia wants to be European state, that it wants to live in the system of values and political institutions that exist in European countries and organizations. Apart from that political maturity expressed in the national consensus on crucial questions, Croatia has shown strength in standing up against the results of the aggression, and affirming its statehood and preserving territorial integrity. Finally, Croatia has also shown political wisdom and imposed itself as an inevitable factor in solving the crisis in the area. With those three elements Croatia in fact qualified itself to enter European organizations.

[Piskor] Did the letter of the opposition and the appearances of their representatives in the Council of Europe have a crucial role in the aforementioned decision of the Political Board of the Council of Europe?

[Simonovic] I would say that the letter and the appearances are only a reflection, the manifestation of the actual situation in Croatia. In Croatia we have a national consensus about the crucial questions of our statehood: the reintegration of the occupied parts and the way to Europe. It has certainly been useful that this unity was once again presented in front of the Political Board. However, the crucial thing is that Croatia simply belongs to Europe.

[Piskor] Talking about the list with 21 precondition for the admission of Croatia, which first had to be signed by both the president of the Republic of Croatia and the chairman of the Chamber of Representatives, are those preconditions special, additional preconditions for Croatia, or is that the usual procedure?

[Simonovic] There are always double demands for the new members. The first demands are the list of standard conditions that apply to everybody, and the others depend upon an individual country and its specific qualities.

[Piskor] It is significant that the decision in Strasbourg occurred after the meeting in Geneva. Did we have to make a concession somewhere else in order to get permission for Europe?

[Simonovic] We did not have to make any concessions in Geneva. However, generally speaking, it is a fact that entering all kinds of associations with other countries means that one cannot do everything one wants to, but

has to take care about the criteria of those associations and the interests of other members. Those rules are valid for any member state of the Council of Europe, EU, NATO, and so on.

[Piskor] What were the main reasons for the Tudjman-Milosevic-Ganic meeting under Christopher's patronage in Geneva, a couple of days before the Moscow meeting which had been scheduled earlier?

[Simonovic] There are two key objectives. The first is to come to Moscow with clear positions, to come to Moscow with a strengthened Federation, with a clear picture of the situation regarding the whole peace process. The second objective is best presented by the reactions, on one side, of Russia, and on the other, of the EU, to the Geneva meeting. Russia was not present at all at the meeting, and the EU was present in a symbolic way, at a level lower than the level of the political directors of the ministries of foreign affairs. By that meeting, America once more wanted to underline its own significance and its leading role in the peace process.

[Piskor] Can the fact that the interests of America, Europe, and Russia separate and go different ways regarding the peace process, have negative consequences for Croatia?

[Simonovic] In its actions, Croatia must bear in mind two relevant factors. One, that without American involvement, the Dayton package would not be possible; two, that without European involvement the Dayton package would not be feasible. Croatia must make use of both its firm strongholds: its good relations and strategic cooperation with the United States, and the fact that it is a European country. As much as there are rivalries, and the question of prestige, I think that regarding the Republic of Croatia there are no strategically diverging interests between the United States and European countries. That was proved beyond doubt by the talks President Tudjman held with Mr. Christopher in Geneva, where they were talking about long-term aspects of positioning the Republic of Croatia in its European environment, at which the United States supported the European orientation of the Republic of Croatia.

[Piskor] What will be the consequences for Croatia of the certain standstill in the implementation of the peace package in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the concept of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Simonovic] Croatia must help Bosnia-Herzegovina out of the crisis and must not allow Bosnia-Herzegovina to pull Croatia under water. Regarding the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the world needs a strong Croatia involved in the integration processes of Europe and the world, which will help Bosnia-Herzegovina get out of the crisis in which it finds itself. We know that and the world knows that.

[Piskor] There are problems obviously in the implementation of the Federation but even more regarding the understanding of the concept of what is the Federation and what is Bosnia-Herzegovina. What is Croatia's prime interest regarding this problem: Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Simonovic] In their importance, two strategic interests of Croatia and its relation toward Bosnia-Herzegovina distinguish themselves. The first one is the care for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is a constitutional obligation of the Croatian state, and the second interest is the result of the fact that Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are connected not only geographically but that Croatia finds a politically and economically, and also potentially militarily, stable and safe Bosnia-Herzegovina exceptionally important.

Relations between the Federation and Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is true, are extremely complex and this complexity yields many problems. What it is about, we can illustrate through the Common Council for Cooperation. The Republic of Croatia in some questions cooperates only with the Federation and in other questions only with Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state. We have a closer cooperation with the Federation than with the central state, but in our cooperation we always respect the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the authorities of the Federation and the central state.

[Piskor] So the relations have not been completely balanced?

[Simonovic] I have already said what Croatia's strategic interests are—to protect Croats and its state interests. The interests of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as presented now, and as it has been put down in the peace package, are to get out of the grave crisis it finds itself in, with the help of the international community and Croatia. We talked about it in Geneva, too. We have talked to representatives of the Croats and Bosniaks about the problems and ways of solving them.

[Piskor] Have you reached agreement over anything?

[Simonovic] It has been pointed out that the organs of the Federation had not yet been established and that it had been solved very slowly, which is a big problem. The cantons have not been established yet, either. Those questions must be solved as soon as possible. It is a lasting process, a process into which Croatia invests a lot of effort, a process that always demands new input in order to move in the desired direction.

[Piskor] Certainly, there must have been a lot of talk about the process of peaceful reintegration of the occupied parts of Croatia in Geneva?

[Simonovic] It seems crucial to me that the reintegration of Croatian Podunavlje [the Danube river basin] is no longer an open question, but that it is a question of time, and this was reiterated in Geneva.

[Piskor] Croatia's displaced persons protest that all of it has been going too slowly. Can that process be accelerated?

[Simonovic] I can understand the impatience of the Croatian displaced, who have been waiting for five years to return, to solve that problem as soon as possible. And it is not a technical problem but a question of their fate. However, the very idea that the possibility of return is now certain, that in fact it is not a possibility, but the organization of a safe return, must have a calming and encouraging effect. As far as the temporal dynamics are concerned, we are doing absolutely everything to speed it up through two processes. The first are the constant talks, negotiations, and agreements with the transitional administration, with General Klein, and the second process is the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia, that is, Serbia and Montenegro.

[Box, p 12]

Ploce

[Piskor] I do not understand completely, like the citizens of Ploce, why the agreement on the harbor is being signed with the Republic and not with the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and does that mean that the other entity in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, "the Serb Republic," will also be allowed access to the sea?

[Simonovic] In some situations the Republic of Croatia, even when it would rather cooperate with the Federation, will have to cooperate with the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, precisely because Croatia will be forced to do that by the internal division of the constitutional authorities within Bosnia-Herzegovina. So wherever it is possible we will cooperate with the Federation as an entity, but in some aspects it will be necessary to work with Bosnia-Herzegovina as an entity.

[Box, p 13]

Bitter Taste

[Piskor] The rapid normalization of relations with Serbia, despite all the justifications, leaves a bitter taste.

[Simonovic] I agree that the normalization with Yugoslavia, that is, Serbia and Montenegro respectively, is not easy for the Republic of Croatia. Because, apart from the justified political and economic reasons, there is always a moral question in the air, the question of aggression, casualties of war, missing persons, punishment for the crimes. We have incessantly been raising, asking anew, the issue of the release of detainees and the fate of missing persons. And now in Geneva we have demanded Milosevic's statement about the problem of missing persons and we were given a promise about cooperation and we will insist on it. One must say that the normalization of relations does not mean absolution for those who have committed war crimes. We will neither forgive nor forget the crimes.

However, we must never forget that precisely the normalization of relations between Croatia and Yugoslavia, as it is going on right now, essentially facilitates the process of reintegration of Croatian Podunavlje. And that is our priority. And we must not place that in question.

Croatia: Daily Views Recent Contact Group Meetings

AU2703182496 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 25 Mar 96 pp 4-5

[Commentary by Aleksandar Milosevic: "Everything Was Said in Geneva"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Many of the participants at the Geneva meeting of the Contact Group for Bosnia-Herzegovina hadn't managed to unpack their diplomatic bags, and already they had to hurry to catch a new flight—for Moscow. In Moscow they discussed everything they had already discussed in Geneva; they discussed implementation of the Dayton agreement, the Rome agreement, and other important documents and agreements on the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In fact, the Moscow meeting was envisaged as a regular meeting to analyze Dayton, but for certain tactical reasons U.S. diplomacy summoned the meeting in Geneva almost overnight and thus put Moscow in an embarassing position. The result was the absence of Russian representatives at the meeting in Geneva. At the Moscow meeting last Saturday, however, Russian diplomacy was trying to compensate for the loss caused by their nonparticipation at the Geneva meeting. One must not forget to say that it did not succeed completely, because the U.S. side again imposed itself as the one that leads the game and leads it by its own rules. True, nobody doubted the status of the Russian hosts, which is the consequence of the meeting being held on their territory, but according to the tone and the context of what was said there the Americans still remain number ne in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

What Is the Reason for the Headaches?

In such circumstances the other European partners were also not particularly satisfied. The European Union is still divided by the various, often opposing, interests of its members and the need to create some kind of European bloc against the big brother from across the Atlantic Ocean is not a sufficient cohesive factor to bind together torn European threads.

Nevertheless, in Moscow they did not forget the actual reason for their meeting. They talked about what has to be done in order to start implementing the Dayton agreement faster and more thoroughly. That had also been the conclusion from Geneva 10 days before, and it was repeated in Moscow. All participants agreed that the military aspects of the Dayton agreement cause far less of a headache than the implementation of the civilian aspects, where there are numerous problems. First of all, there is a dangerous possibility that the elections on the territory of the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina, envisaged to occur in September, will not be held at all. In some analysts' opinions, it would be the end of the peace efforts and political defeat for those who have exerted all their influence in order to achieve peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The other thing that worried the participants of the meetings in Geneva and Moscow are the standstills in the implementation, that is, in the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Obviously, there are some disputable problems and interpretations of the documents from the constitution to the question of the territorial organization of the Federation. Mostar, which is not as big a problem as it used to be, then Sarajevo, Bugojno, and even some other parts of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina are still putting relations between the federal partners to the test. On the other hand, the so-called Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not ready to implement the civilian part of the agreement in its enitrety. In Moscow the strongest weapon was drawn—the threat of economic sanctions if all prisoners of war were not released within eight days. If any of the sides in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina will keep prisoners of war in their prisons, there will be no meeting in Brussels on 20 April. And it is exactly in the Belgian capital that some concrete conclusions are to be reached on the financial and economic aid to the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Croatia Is Not Disturbing the Agreements

According to the list of those in attendence, the Moscow meeting was one level lower than Geneva because only foreign ministers took part in Moscow, while there were three presidents in Geneva: Tudjman, Izetbegovic, and Milosevic. However, regardless of the fact that the three states—Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the "FRY"—were represented by their heads of diplomacy, it is significant what positions these countries have, according to what was said in Moscow.

Croatia can be perfectly satisfied because it has never been mentioned in any kind of negative context. Obviously Croatia, in the opinion of the Contact Group, is not a factor that disturbs international agreements. However, warnings were sent to the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to Belgrade. The U.S. representative openly warned the Belgrade head of diplomacy, Milutinovic, not to forget that the sanctions against Belgrade had not been withdrawn but only suspended and that they can be fully reimposed overnight. At the same time, that was a warning to Moscow, which has been trying to win an as favorable as possible position for its Belgrade protegees and convince the world that the peace on the territory of former Yugoslavia was only achieved thanks to Slobodan Milosevic and his followers.

Threatening Finger for Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina—which has had almost unlimited credit in many political circles in the world for a long time—is finding itself in a more and more exposed position because of some of its moves, particularly those regarding the obstruction of a part of the Dayton agreement regarding the composition of the police forces in Sarajevo but also some other decisions. The warning that the foreign mercenaries who are still in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina represent a real threat to IFOR [Implementation Force] and the peace process is a clear warning to Sarajevo that the mujahidins, who apparently have not left Bosnia-Herzegovina yet, must leave as soon as possible. The international community is also not satisfied with what is going on in Bugojno and in some other parts of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it was heard clearly at the Moscow meeting that not only the propaganda of Pale, but also that of the government headed by Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic was responsible for the exodus of the Serbs from some parts of Sarajevo.

There Is No Question of Prevlaka

Of course, Croatian diplomacy used the Moscow meeting to reiterate what is the most important thing to Zagreb at the moment—the process of the peaceful reintegration of Croatian Podunavlje [Danube River basin]. Dr. Mate Granic discussed this with his German colleague Klaus Kinkel, the Italian head of diplomacy Susanna Agnelli, the representative of the European Union Hans van den Broek, and the Belgrade head of diplo-

macy, Milan Milutinovic. The Serbian side still insists that the solution of the question of Prevlaka is the precondition for the mutual recognition of Croatia and the so-called FRY. For Croatia, however, Prevlaka is not in question because it is an integral part of Croatian territory within its internationally recognized borders. Zagreb, even if it wanted to speed up the process of mutual recognition between Croatia and the so-called FRY with some kind of territorial concessions, could not do so. According to the Croatian Constitution, in order to change the borders there should be a referendum, and there is no Croatian political power that could convince the Croatian people and the citizens of Croatia that they should give up any part of their territory because of some pragmatic political moves. After all, the immutability of borders is one of the basic provisions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe protocol, of which Croatia is a full member. The border changes would be contrary to the provisions of that international association.

Although the Moscow meeting was only a rerun of the same theme expounded 10 days earlier in Geneva, it was nevertheless pretty important for Croatia because it confirmed Croatia's political position and role in solving the whole crisis in this area. Certainly, the decision of the Political Board of the Council of Europe on the recommendation to admit Croatia to full membership of that oldest European integration body was also a plus for Croatia's overall political position in Moscow. It is also certain that the following meetings will only confirm the correctness of Croatian foreign policy, and even further strengthen Croatia's position and importance as an unavoidable regional power. All this will only speed up the process of the peaceful reintegration of Croatian Podunavlje without which—the participants of the Moscow meeting know that very well—there will be no lasting peace in this area.

Croatia: Sid, Beli Manastir Officials Hold Talks

AU2703171696 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Beli Manastir municipal authorities have been in contact with reputable businessmen from Srem and Backa regarding the establishment of new forms of business cooperation. One such meeting was held in Beli Manastir yesterday. Correspondents have a report on that, as well as the statements by the president of the Sid Municipal Assembly, Borisav Savic, and the general manager of the (?Srem) meat packing and canning industry, Nebojsa (?Krmic).

[Unidentified correspondent] A delegation of businessmen and representatives of the Sid Municipal Assembly visited Beli Manastir today. The goal of their visit was to reach an agreement on improvement of the existing forms of cooperation between these two municipalities and on the establishment of new ones.

The Sid delegation was received by Slobodan Milovac, the president of Beli Manastir Municipality. During the meeting, mutual interest was expressed in the economic cooperation between Baranja and the above-mentioned Srem municipality continuing to develop.

[Savic] We came to this area [words indistinct] to show and prove [passage indistinct] we want to develop economic cooperation. I think that we can, want to, and must do so, [passage indistinct] show the willingness for cooperation with our agricultural [words indistinct]. We hope that these talks will [words indistinct] and that the economic cooperation between Sid Municipality and Beli Manastir Municipality, between our companies and our [passage indistinct] cultural, sport, and all other aspects of cooperation.

[(?Krmic)] The main goal of our visit was to extend the economic cooperation with this area, in which the Belje meat packing and canning industry has an important role. It is our intention to establish very close business relations with Belje.

I think that the meeting has shown that [words indistinct] cooperation, and there is no reason for us not to [words indistinct] establish business relations as early as next month.

[Unidentified correspondent] This is what the Sid businessmen said—obviously they are very interested in cooperation with Baranja. This area has always been a good source of raw materials for all forms of processing capacities, particularly the food processing industry.

Sid and Beli Manastir, as we have seen today, may have a lot in common in that aspect.

Croatia: Change in Presidential Veto Law Proposed

LD2703185696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1502 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 27 Mar (TANJUG)—Deputies of the opposition parties in the Croatian parliament proposed today that changes to the law on local self-government and on the city of Zagreb should be passed quickly, terminating the form of "veto" which Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has over the election of mayor.

The opposition is calling for the scrapping of the provision in the law under which the Croatian president has the right to endorse or reject the election of the mayor of Zagreb, who is chosen by the city assembly.

On the basis of this legal power, Tudjman has already refused three times to endorse the mayors of Zagreb from the ranks of the opposition, who were elected by a majority of votes in the city's parliament.

The opposition representatives explain in their motion to change the law that this would create the preconditions for resolving the political crisis which has arisen over the election of mayor and, at the same time, Croatia would be fulfilling its obligations under the conditions for acceptance into the Council of Europe.

It will be decided next Friday whether the ruling Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] will allow the proposed changes to these laws to be submitted to the Assembly.

FYROM: Commentary on Expectations From Brussels Meeting

AU2703182396 Skopje MIC in English 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Although the draft-text of the Agreement with the EU has a number of controversial formulations, the vice-premier of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Government Jane Miljovski informed at yesterday's news conference that the attention of the Macedonian delegation in the negotiations will be focused on two large remarks. First, the draft-agreement overemphasizes the regional cooperation, even in places where it should stand European cooperation or cooperation with third countries. The close cooperation with all the countries in the region is a condition without which there is no survival for Macedonia, however, the Government assesses that it is incorrect to condition Macedonia's association with the Union with regional cooperation, since two sides are necessary for its furtherance. Thus, the Macedonian side will insist in the negotiations that the country's qualification for association with the Union is measured only according to the results achieved in the economic reforms, the reduction of trade restrictions, the preservation of the living environment, the fortification of the democratic institutions, the advancement and protection of the human and minority rights, and not according to the results of the neighbors, which are far behind in the fulfillment of some of these conditions.

The Government's second remark is related to the fact that the offered document does not emphasize that an associative agreement will be signed, but only that the Macedonian wishes will be taken into consideration. Therefore, the Macedonian delegation will insist on a stronger formulation in the Agreement. Aside from this, the first round of negotiations in Brussels will last two days, consisting of two parts: general and technical negotiations. The second meeting is scheduled for April 16th in Skopje, and depending on the needs, it will also be possible to set up a third meeting of the two delegations. The date set for the signing of the Agreement on cooperation—May 28, is accepted for now, but with a degree of reservation.

FYROM: Article Views EU's Changed Attitude Toward State

AU2803092896 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 27 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Nevenka Mitrevska: "Why Did Europe Change Its Mind?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The presence of the President of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Kiro Gligorov at the government's session two days ago, and particularly the views he expressed in the debate on defining Macedonia's position on the forthcoming negotiations for an agreement on cooperation with the European Union, confirmed at least two things: First, the great importance our country attaches to the agreement and association with the Union, which has never been in dispute; second, the recent reports about the alleged radical change in the attitude of Brussels toward the Republic of Macedonia are, unfortunately, true. It is as if not just three months have passed, but whole decades, since the European Commission's first mandate for starting negotiations with Macedonia, according to which we got everything we asked for, up to the draft text of the agreement which forms the basis for the negotiations that are to start in Brussels tomorrow.

According to current moderate and unofficial information, the so-called evolutionary clause that opened the door for Macedonia to the second phase of harmonization with the Union has been "diluted" and it is only contained in the first article. The text speaks about the Union's so-called regional approach toward Macedonia, which, contrary to all assertions from Brussels, means nothing but pushing Macedonia into the same basket with all the countries in the region, either the countries of the former Yugoslavia or the Balkans in general, as a condition for an eventual future group association with the Union; there is also a clause asking for respect for minority, and particularly human rights, as if Macedonia had not passed these tests before its admission to the OSCE [Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe] and the Council of Europe. In other words, the text of the draft agreement offered by the Union treats Macedonia practically the same way as Serbia and Croatia, countries that have waged a war and countries that have not yet started the road to political and economic transformation, as a condition for association with the European Union!

What led to such a big change in the view of Brussels which is undoubtedly unfavorable for Macedonia? The explanation we have been given in the past days that "nothing has been changed in the Union, but the changes occurred in Macedonia" could be true to a degree, but that is certainly not sufficient. Regardless of who evaluates them and how, the domestic political changes in the Republic of Macedonia did not threaten the basic orientation of Macedonian foreign policy, or the determination of Macedonian society to proceed with the reforms and achieve the democratic and market standards of the Union's member states. The reason for the change, therefore, must be sought elsewhere, in Brussels—which is a symbol of European

bureaucracy—and in every member state of the Union separately and jointly—as political factors on the continent. Until only yesterday, for all of them Macedonia represented an example of the one former Yugoslav republic that had forged its independence by peaceful means; it was an example of a multicultural community that showed that peaceful coexistence among different ethnic groups is possible; it was a kind of an "economic miracle" that not only managed to survive under impossible circumstances, but had embarked resolutely on economic reforms; and finally, it was an example of a country that, by maintaining internal peace, practically maintained peace in the southern Balkans. Something huge must have happened in the last few months for the situation to have changed so radically, for Macedonia to be deprived of all these "attributes," and for the evolution of the Union's view toward Macedonia—from an active interest in maintaining Macedonia's stability and for cooperation, to losing all interest in the Balkans. What were the huge events in this part of the world after the Dayton peace agreement was signed and after the suffocation of bloody animosities in Bosnia? Is it possible for the Union, in spite of the persistent events in Bosnia and the fragile and insecure peace, to believe that the danger that threatened the Balkans has passed? Can it afford to lose interest and deny responsibility for this appalling part of the continent so as to drown itself again in abundant self-satisfaction and egoism? Their latest "brainchild" of adopting a group approach of the Union toward all the states in the Balkans, regardless of their specific situations and regardless of the different levels they have accomplished as conditions for admission to the Union, can only be described as egoism. In spite of its best will, Brussels is acting carelessly toward the development of the whole Balkan region and it is allowing events to be dictated by the slowest Balkan player, in this case Serbia. It is doing this without taking into the account the tragic consequences that could result not only for the nations in the region, but also in the European territory at large, if this part of Europe continues to lag behind in its economic and democratic development.

As far as Macedonia is concerned, the first warning sign about changes in Brussels' views toward it was the recent news that arrived from Rome that our country was excluded from the so-called Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of regions devastated by war in former Yugoslavia. Although not devastated by war, the Republic of Macedonia suffered serious direct damage from the war and from the subsequent international sanctions and unilateral blockades. So, the once upon a time "Marshall mini plan" was actually an idea of the Macedonian leadership for the reconstruction of Macedonia, in which Germany was the first to become interested. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel revealed the plan in public together with his French counterpart, Herve de Charette. After that, the whole European Union became interested, expanding it gradually over the whole region of former Yugoslavia, until the moment when in Rome only the annexed "wagon" remained, without the "locomotive," that is, Macedonia. This prompted Macedonian diplomacy to start an offensive in European capitals, to try to find out the reasons for this change, and to lobby for support at least from those countries that have so far demonstrated they are friendly to ours.

The time, however, seems to have been wasted, and in such an atmosphere the high-level Macedonian delegation headed by Vice Premier Jane Miljovski will sit at the negotiating table in Brussels tomorrow. On the other side of the table, there will be an official of the European Commission with as much authority as he is granted in the "paper" in front of him. How are these—undoubtedly incongruous—negotiations going to be carried out and for how long? If it finds out that the European Union is not prepared to grant more favorable conditions, can Macedonia simply say "I am not interested" in cooperation and association with the Union and cancel the negotiations? The negotiations can go on indefinitely as far as the Union is concerned because it is not in a hurry. We are. As for the possible canceling of the negotiations, we have enough miserable examples of countries in our immediate vicinity that believed they could be self-sufficient in the last few decades and refused to "associate" with others.

FYROM: Goverment Proposes New Law on Civil Initiatives

AU2703171596 Skopje MIC in English 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Government of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] has adopted a draft-law regulating civil initiatives, which is to be reviewed by the Macedonian Assembly tomorrow.

Justice Minister Vlado Popovski told yesterday's news conference that the proposal for a Law on the collection of voters' signatures is based on Swiss experiences, where the legislation in this domain has gone the furthest. The Law is comprised of only 13 articles. At the start, it is stipulated that the initiative can be launched by 100 voters, a registered political party or a civil association. As initiators, they are required to inform the chairman of the Macedonian Assembly and to submit the text of the law that is proposed, the question for which a referendum is suggested, i.e. the text of the proposal for making amendments to the Constitution. The Assembly chairman will have three

days time to examine the regularity of the initiative, and provided he concludes everything is in order, he is required to inform the competent minister of this, through the Prime Minister. If, on the other hand, the Assembly chairman determines that the initiative is not regular, he places it on the daily agenda of the next parliamentary session, whereby the Assembly reaches its own conclusion. If the initiators are not satisfied with the decision, the law provides for them to pursue the issue in court.

FYROM: Gosev Says Government Fears Electoral Defeat

AU2703171396 Skopje MIC in English 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Monday's Government proposals for the adoption of a law on the collection of voters' signatures for the proposal of a law on issuing a notice on referendum and a proposal for amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], according to the Democratic Party, indicate that the initiative for collecting 150,000 signatures is a political success.

Emphasizing that the initiative is entirely in accordance with the Constitution, the leader of the Party Petar Gosev added at yesterday's new conference, that "the peak is reacting with panic to the realization that the action will succeed and that it will put an end to their arrogant and incompetent rule."

Gosev voiced the stand of the Democratic Party that the authorities, in the name of personal interests, are making a mockery out of the legal system, thus creating sources of instability of the state.

"We have been waiting for some dozen laws that are imperative for the system for over five years now, and suddenly, overnight and secretly, they are preparing changes to the laws which, in principle, are not ambiguous, but their implementation endangers the authorities," Petar Gosev said.

Otherwise, yesterday as well, we could not receive any information from the Democratic Party which, together with the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], is the organizer of the initiative for collecting 150,000 signatures, as to the citizens' response to this campaign—in figures. It was said that the action is conducted with results exceeding expectations and that soon the final figure of the collected signatures will be released.

Poland: Officials Receive Iraqi Foreign Ministry Official

JN2703201696 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1800 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 27 Mar (INA)—Dr. Riyad al-Qaysi, under secretary of the [Iraqi] Foreign Ministry, met Olga Krzyzanowska, deputy speaker of the Polish National Assembly, in Warsaw today.

Al-Qaysi explained the recent developments in the relationship between Iraq and the UN Security Council, as well as Iraq's fulfillment of its commitments to the UN resolutions, which requires lifting the unjust blockade imposed on Iraq.

The Polish official expressed her country's understanding of the Iraqi people's suffering as a result of the continued blockade. She stressed Poland's desire to work to end this blockade.

Earlier today, al-Qaysi met with the under secretaries of finance and foreign economic relations. Senior officials from both ministries were also present. Al-Qaysi and the Polish officials discussed ways to enhance and promote relations between Iraq and Poland. They also stressed the importance of meetings of the Joint Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation between both friendly countries.

Poland: British Ambassador on Queen's Visit, EU, NATO

WS2703160496 Poznan WPROST in Polish 31 Mar 96 p 17

[Interview with Michael Llewellyn Smith, ambassador of Great Britain to Poland, by Jaroslaw Gizinski; place and date not given: "The Eagle and the Lion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gizinski] How important is Queen Elizabeth II's visit to Polish-British relations?

[Llewelyn-Smith] It is an extremely important event. This is the first visit of the ruling British monarch to Poland. It is not a coincidence that the visit is taking place at a moment when Poland is going through a period of transformations, initiated in 1989. The visit shows the range of Polish-British relations. The historic depth of these relations is illustrated by the recently opened exhibit entitled "The Eagle and the Lion," held in the Royal Castle. Aside from confirming the nine-century-long historical ties, the visit emphasizes our contemporary partnership.

[Gizinski] Can Poland count on more unequivocal support from Great Britain when the conditions of our integration with the EU are being specified?

[Llewelyn-Smith] The Polish Republic can expect support from us both during the process of enlarging the scope of European institutions and discussions in Brussels on the conditions of obtaining broader access to EU markets. We support the idea of having the most liberal system of free trade within the EU, but also of opening the European markets more widely to Polish products.

[Gizinski] Still, one can get the impression that in Great Britain the mood that is conventionally referred to as "Euro-skepticism" is still widespread.

[Llewelyn-Smith] This is not a very fortunate name; it should be looked upon as an oversimplification. This skepticism applies only to some characteristics of the EU in the form in which it is functioning today. However, Great Britain is and will be a member of the EU, there is no doubt about that. On many issues we differ from the European Commission in Brussels, and we do not agree with our partners as far as the scope of proposed actions is concerned—for example, in the area of social policy. This does not mean, however, that Great Britain will oppose the remaining 14 states. The EU is a complex geometrical structure, inside of which a coincidence of interests develops in many areas. I am convinced that, at the intergovernmental conference, we will manage to determine how the EU should develop its institutions to prepare for the future expansion—and for the admission of Poland.

[Gizinski] Over the past few years, we could see rapid growth in capital spending by British companies in our country. Does this mean that British investors began to see Poland as a promising region?

[Llewelyn-Smith] British investors are attracted by the size of the Polish market and by the growing possibilities of making profits. Companies that are already operating in Poland include consumer goods manufacturers, food-processing companies, cosmetics and detergents manufacturers; others have a stake in the oil and power industries. Close contacts are being maintained in the sphere of banking and legal services, as well as in the insurance sector. Last week representatives of the British Chamber of Commerce in Poland met with Aleksander Kwasniewski. We heard that the president would do his best to deepen economic ties to Great Britain, which I fully support. During the visit of the royal couple, the British Chamber of Commerce is organizing a seminar devoted to capital spending in Poland; the Duke of Edinburgh will attend it.

[Gizinski] Soon after the Queen's visit, your term as the British ambassador in Warsaw will expire. Having spent four and a half years in our country, what associations will the word "Poland" bring forth in your mind?

[Llewelyn-Smith] I am leaving with the conviction that a national consensus was reached on issues that are most important to Poland. Of course, I am aware of the ongoing disputes, but, above all, the divisions I can see agreement on the most vital goal, which is integration with the EU and NATO. The "azimuth" specified by Professor Skubiszewski [former foreign minister] is pinpointing the right direction, and it is generally approved. I can see a similar phenomenon in the area of domestic policy; despite numerous discussions, a conviction about the priority of a free market economy and the private sector prevails.

My service in Poland was also a fascinating personal experience for me and my wife. Therefore, I can say frankly that we are leaving with a feeling of some regret. However, such are the requirements of my diplomatic service, which I will continue in Greece.

Poland: Trial of Former Interior Minister Adjourns

LD2703134196 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1200 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The provincial court in Warsaw did not examine today the proposal by the prosecutor to hold the trial of former Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] head Antoni Macierewicz in secret. Macierewicz is accused of violating the law on state secrecy in 1992. The court postponed the trial until tomorrow.

Lawyer Andrzej Lew-Mirski, Macierewicz's defense counsel, said that the reason for this decision was the inappropriate behavior of the public that had gathered outside the courtroom and the presence in the courtroom of outsiders not directly involved in the case, who did not want to leave. [passage omitted]

Poland: Oleksy Anxious To Be Cleared of Spying Charges

LD2703174296 Warsaw Radio Zet Network in Polish 0710 GMT 27 Mar 96

[Studio interview with Jozef Oleksy, former Polish prime minister and current chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, SdRP, by an unidentified announcer—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Announcer] How do you now assess your political situation, your situation after four months of this affair [of being suspected of collaborating with a foreign intelligence service]?

[Oleksy] This has been going on for a very long time, too long, I think. I also think it is high time there was some clarity because unauthorized interpretations are continuing, and, unfortunately, this passing of judgment in advance, without waiting for the law to take effect, testifies badly to Polish political and democratic manners. [passage omitted]

It would be good if there were some clarity because for me this is a very difficult situation. I cannot keep on putting things straight all the time and saying what I think about all this. In any case, I have been refraining from comment for a long time, as can clearly be seen, because I am relying on the democratic outcome of this matter, and this is what I expected from all the rest. But this has been done unevenly.

[Announcer] Are you talking to the prosecutor who is conducting the case?

[Oleksy] No, I have not had any contact with him. And I do not have any contact with this matter at all, either. I expect this matter to be concluded in an honest manner on the basis of principles. I am not trying to participate in it in any way unless this is clearly required.

[Announcer] When do you think it will end?

[Oleksy] I do not know. I can rely only on the public statements made by the military prosecutor, and all I can do is wait for the matter to end. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] How should the president behave during his visit to Belarus?

[Announcer] Just the same as ever, as the president of a country that has had a visit and talks scheduled a long way back and ...

[Announcer, interrupting] The visit was indeed planned a long time ago, but now something has changed.

[Oleksy] I know that right now critical voices have become strident, wondering whether this visit should take place. [passage omitted]

I shall not prejudge anything in this matter. I do not think there should be any speculation or moves here that might spoil things. If something can be changed before the visit, then this has to be well thought through. But I would desist from making statements aimed at canceling this visit. [passage omitted]

Poland: Appointment of WSI Chief 'Shock' to Wilecki

WS2703150096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by Pawel Wronski and Jerzy Jachowicz: "Military Intelligence Has a New Chief; Undercutting Wilecki"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Commander Kazimierz Glowacki has been appointed the new chief of the*

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Military Information Services [WSI]. Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski dismissed the previous chief, General Konstanty Malejczyk.

Glowacki formerly headed military counterintelligence for three years. His appointment is Dobrzanski's first staffing move since the new Law on the Office of the Defense Minister came into effect. The law gives him full control over military intelligence and counterintelligence. Up to now, the WSI was an element of the power struggle between the General Staff and the civilian part of the Ministry of National Defense [MON]. Malejczyk's dismissal is a second serious blow dealt to the General Staff. The first blow was the liquidation of the financial board at the General Staff by Minister Dobrzanski.

Gen. Malejczyk was one of the most trusted men of General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff. Wilecki recommended him to be chief of the WSI when military intelligence and counterintelligence were subordinated to the General Staff on the basis of an ordinance issued by [former Defense Minister] Piotr Kolodziejczyk.

After the Drawsko dinner, at which the WSI played an important role, [former Defense] Minister Zbigniew Okonski dismissed Glowacki, the chief of counterintelligence at the time and the last high-ranking WSI officer loyal to Kolodziejczyk. It was Glowacki who issued orders to tap Gen. Wilecki's telephone conversations in Drawsko. Commander Glowacki was sidetracked for two years because, as Okonski said, there was no post that fit his qualifications.

Yesterday's appointment came as a complete shock to Gen. Wilecki. The General Staff considered Glowacki disloyal to the officer caste. "I will not hide that this move may be viewed as a slap in the face for the General Staff," a general who asked to remain anonymous told GAZETA WYBORCZA. "An officer should not comment on decisions made by the minister," said Colonel Zdzislaw Czekierda, General Staff spokesman.

No one at the General Staff wanted to comment on Gen. Malejczyk's dismissal, although it had been expected by everyone. Representatives of the General Staff claim that thus far Minister Dobrzanski has criticized neither the WSI nor its chief. "I can even say that Minister Dobrzanski spoke highly of Gen. Malejczyk's work," said Colonel Czekierda. "People do not get appointed to offices in the military for life," said MON Spokesman Colonel Eugeniusz Mleczak curtly.

Ryszard Bugaj, a Union of Labor deputy and member of the Sejm Secret Services Commission, protested yesterday that the commission had not been consulted on the appointment of the new WSI chief.

Commander Glowacki is 56. Having graduated from the Higher Navy School in 1966, he served as chief navigator on the "Blyskawica" destroyer. In 1968 he went on to work at the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. He was deputy military attache in Canada (1979-83) and military attache in Great Britain (1986-90).

[Box, p 3]

General Wilecki's authority in the Armed Forces was based on the fact that he always looked after loyal officers. He currently has to sacrifice them in the name of the game he is playing with President Kwasniewski. Now that the chief of the WSI has been dismissed, those who know what is going on within the General Staff are asking themselves only one question: When will Wilecki resign?

Poland: Defense Communications Systems Conference Report

96EP0036B Warsaw MYSL WOJSKOWA in Polish Jan-Feb 96 pp 142-145

[Article by Major Adam Lipowski: "Communications and Computer Systems for the National Defense and Security of the Polish Republic: Fourth International Scientific Conference"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 4 to 6 October 1995, at the Higher Officers School of Communication Troops in Zegrz, the fourth International Scientific Conference was held. This time the topic was "Communications and Computer Systems for the National Defense and Security of the Polish Republic."

The conference was held under the auspices of Minister of Communications Andrzej Zielinski and the chief of Communications and Computer Troops Command of the General Staff of the Polish Army, Brigadier General Witold Cieslewski.

The conference participants (about 300) represented: the Office of National Security, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Communications, the Office for State Protection, the Border Guard, Telekomunikacja Polska, S.A., and military and civilian universities and research and development institutes, as well as the InterProm International Center for Business Promotion.

The purpose of the conference was to evaluate the current state and define the growth prospects for communications and computer systems, with special consideration for systems relating to Polish national defense. In

this last respect, the evaluation concerned chiefly military systems.

At the conference, the results of research and development work and the experience gained in the organization and operation of communications systems and the design, manufacture, and use of communications and computer equipment were presented

Discussions were held at plenary sessions and pertained to fundamental problems of communications and computer systems, systems for the protection of information, and business systems. In addition, a panel discussion on computer and communications systems from the standpoint of the integration of the Polish Armed Forces into NATO was held.

More than 50 papers were presented, and more than 70 were published in the conference proceedings.

The guiding idea in these papers was the future of digital information systems with regard to meeting the needs of the national defense and security of the republic. Of major importance is assuring a compatible development of public and special communications and computer systems from the standpoint of integration with NATO. This motif was present in many speeches.

The current status and development of Polish telecommunications, including the construction of a communications system to meet the needs of broadly conceived government administration, were discussed by Deputy Minister of Communications Stanislaw Popiolek at the inaugural session.

At the plenary session, on opening day, the paper, "A Promising Communications System for a Tactical Formation," authored by faculty members of the WSOWL (Higher Officers School of Communication Troops), was presented. The WSOWL was the only one of the academic and research and development institutions to translate into reality a recommendation made at the preceding conference and develop the concept of a communications system that would meet the needs of national defense and national security, with allowance for worldwide trends in introducing communications systems based on network structures.

Many of the papers dealt with aspects of broadly conceived communications security. Colonel Marek Suchanski, of the Military Institute of Communications, who holds a doctorate in engineering, presented the paper "Information Security as an Element of the Self-Sufficiency of National Defense" at the plenary session.

Poland: Status of Missile, Artillery Forces in 1994-95

96EP0036C Warsaw MYSL WOJSKOWA in Polish Jan-Feb 96 pp 146-148

[Article by Colonel Ryszard Solecki: "Missile and Artillery Troops: Implementation of Objectives During 1994-95"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two more years of existence of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, of their transformation in the new political and economic reality, have passed. For a process of intensive changes this is a sufficiently long period to notice evident changes. To assess these changes, the chief of the Training Inspectorate, Major General Leon Komornicki, has instructed the heads of his subordinate directorates and departments to render an accounting of the implementation of objectives during that period.

On 10 October 1995 the performance of missile and artillery troops was reported on by Colonel (Brevet) Slawomir Oleszczak, deputy chief of the missile and artillery troops of the Polish Army. His report distinguished among several groups of problems corresponding to the operational and training objectives defined in the order of October 1993 of the chief of the Polish General Staff. They pertained to:

—development of missile and artillery troops;

—role and place of the missile and artillery troops command in the context of the changes in the Armed Forces command system;

—computers as an aid to WRiA (missile and artillery troops) command and training;

—development of manuals and instructions;

—WRiA training;

—military education;

—publications.

The reorganization, initiated in 1993, of the missile and artillery troops has been continuing. The changes in structures and organization were implemented from the standpoint of the requirements of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, CFE. Priority was, and continues to be, given to technological modernization, oriented chiefly to increasing the mobility of WRiA and streamlining the command, reconnaissance, and fire guidance systems.

A methodical treatment of the problem was promoted by the development forecast prepared as far back as 1991, and later by an assessment study of WRiA equipment

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and appraisal of the development of reconnaissance and fire guidance systems.

The missile and artillery troops are currently entering upon a new stage of development, based on a program for technological modernization during 1996-97, and in the long run until 2000. A timetable for the implementation of the objectives of this program by the WRiA has been prepared.

The restructuring of the missile and artillery troops has necessitated developing and introducing for them new objectives and rules of operational combat, including those relating to fire support, combat reconnaissance, and security, as well as defining the role and place of the WRiA Command in relation to the changes in the Armed Forces command system.

These matters are considered by the instructions and rules manuals developed by the WRiA Command and issued in the years 1993-95, including: "Manual of Tactical Operations of Army Artillery, Part II (Subunits)," and "Firing and Fire Guidance Instructions for Subunits of Army Artillery, Part I (Unit, Battery, Platoon, Gun)." In addition, "Manual of Tactical Operations of Army Artillery, Part I (Tactical Formation, Units)," and "Part III (Units and Subunits)" already exist in draft form.

Much attention is being devoted to work on refining command, reconnaissance, and fire guidance computer systems. This is reflected in, among other things, such study guides as "Selected Problems of Command Automation at Missile and Artillery Troops" and the research project, "An Automated Artillery Fire Guidance System." In addition, "Structure of Objectives for the Computer Systems Used by the WRiA Command at Command Posts" is being drafted.

Research into computerized decisionmaking processes based on the utilization of computer networks will be continued.

In this way the WRiA is staying abreast of the ongoing structural and functional changes, and is adapting itself to the new requirements of the basic documents governing its operations and training.

In the training of missile and artillery troops the principal emphasis is placed on the execution of operational and combat fire support objectives, both independently and in cooperation with other branches of services, and particularly with Air Force subunits.

Training curriculums and exercises were designed to cope with these problems during the period considered.

The training of subunits was based on newly developed programs for the subunits handling 122-mm howitzers and 152-mm AH [expansion unknown], 2S1, 2S7, and DANA [expansion unknown], as well as for support companies, antitank artillery, missile artillery, artillery reconnaissance subunits, and the artillery of mountain infantry and of 5 Mechanized BZ [expansion unknown] Teams.

For the future, also in the context of membership in NATO, the missile and artillery troops command has drafted a concept for a 12-month training period for WRiA subunits.

An important place in the development of WRiA is military education. In recent years major changes have taken place in this respect. Following the shutdown of all artillery training centers, the WRiA Training Center was established at the General J. Bem Senior Officers Training School in Torun.

The curriculum comprises:

—specialist training of warrant officers as commanders of artillery subunits;

—specialist land artillery training of cadets under the two-year warrant officer program;

—specialist training of noncommissioned reserve officers—candidates for reserve warrant officers—as commanders of artillery platoons;

—specialist training of basic military service personnel to exercise principal functions in WRiA subunits.

Retraining courses in various specialties will be given for career and reserve officers. Such training will include retraining courses for the WRiA command cadres and for the commanders of artillery regiments, brigades, all-arms divisional and brigade artillery units, and antitank regiments.

To this end, during 1994-95 a total of 14 instructional programs for various disciplines and specialties were prepared.

Ending his presentation of two years of accomplishments of the WRiA, Colonel Slawomir Oleszczak described the related publishing work.

During 1993-95 military periodicals published 63 articles on WRiA problems, authored by WRiA Command officers or commissioned by that command. These articles were published in, among other periodicals, MYSL WOJSKOWA and PRZEGLAD WOJSK LADOWYCH. A great many were also published in ZESZYTY NAUKOWE WSO IM. GEN. J. BEMA.

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Aside from these, the Academic Press of the Senior Officers School in Torun published, in collaboration with the WRiA chair at the Academy of National Defense, studies and materials under the title "Artyleria w operacji i walce" [The Artillery in Operation and Combat], No. 1, 1994. A second issue is being prepared.

As noted above, the missile and artillery troops are entering into a new stage of their development. As with the entire Armed Forces, the related objectives will be accomplished in a specific financial and material context, and their scope and pace will directly ensue from that context.

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Romania: Tinca Discusses Arms Industry, NATO

AU2703201696 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 21 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by Doru Dragomir on statement made by Romania's Defense Minster, Gheorghe Tinca, during a news conference held on 20 March: "It Will Not Be the End of the World If Romania Does Not Join NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Our Country Has To Recover $1 Billion From Iraq for Arms Sales

"Romania has to recover almost $1 billion from Iraq for arms export." This is a statement made by Romania's Minster of National Defense Gheorghe Tinca during a news conference held yesterday, 20 March, at the National Military Circle in Bucharest.

In connection with the stage of equipping the army, Gheorghe Tinca mentioned that currently 19 programs with foreign partners are in the process of unfolding. "In the next two to five years, these programs will be developed, and concurrently we will work on the technological redressing of the arms industry." In connection with this aspect, the minister of national defense admitted that there are excellent relations between Romania and Israel on a military level, mainly as regards cooperation in the area of military technology production. "As always, Israel positioned itself very well. It moved fast." This was the answer that the minister of national defense gave to the correspondent of the Voice of Israel radio station. He also mentioned that Israel was less stingy when it came to licenses, which it offered Romania before others. In this way, Gheorghe Tinca said, the accord of confidentiality concluded with the State of Israel will be respected and he wished to assure that country also in this way that "what Israel tells us will not be passed on to others."

The Arms Licenses for Cobra Have Not Yet Been Discussed

Negotiations for the Cobra contract are in progress. So far, Romania has obtained the license for the body of the helicopter. However, the license for the armament of the helicopter has not yet been discussed. As regards the defense industry, Gheorghe Tinca said that we have a very extensive industry. "Some of its areas are performing very well, while others have to be changed. The restructuring of the defense industry in terms of its size will be carried out by taking into account the social costs. The conversion is very costly for the state." The budget is insufficient, and one should seek resources outside the budget. There is a lot of carelessness in the way money is being used at the level of the Defense Ministry and there are even some cases of embezzlement. However, Gheorghe Tinca said: "My hand will not shake when I sign the order for the dismissal of the guilty persons."

In connection with Romania's association to NATO, the defense minister said that talks will be held very soon with representatives of that body, and if the integration is not going to take place: "this will not mean the end of the world!"

Romania: SRI General Views National Security Threats

AU2703203796 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 18 Mar 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Fundamentalist Groups of Hamas Are Determined To Initiate Terrorist Actions on Romanian Territory as Well"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Friday and Saturday [15 and 16 March], the National Information Institute hosted the session of scientific papers on the theme "Romania—The Acceleration of Transition." Among the various renowned personalities who presented provoking views was Brigade General Vasile Lupu, first deputy of the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] director. In a study titled "Current Issues Related to the Intelligence Activity Carried Out by the SRI To Eliminate Threats to National Security," he made an exceptional analysis of Romanian society today. We hereby present passages excerpted from this excellent synthesis, referring to corruption, terrorism, law violation, and other grave crimes:

Economic Espionage

Activities specific to economic espionage—in both of its forms, namely the gathering of secret data and information (espionage proper) as well as its elimination as competition (misinformation)—are connected to the perception of Romania's geopolitical importance, as well as that of the value of its human and material potential.

In this respect, Romania has been and is the target of numerous actions carried out by foreign intelligence services pursuing the goal of triggering or amplifying imbalances in our strategic national [economic] branches by the loss of traditional markets or raw material sources, by causing difficulties in our commercial exchanges with Western countries, by creating preferential financial or trade relations, unfair competition, and the forcing of disadvantageous contract clauses, by the bribing and blackmailing of public servants working for government or central or local administration bodies.

The majority of the intelligence services abroad grant special importance to the economic sphere.

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Their methods to gather information of economic nature include:

—The utilization of relevant data circulated by the media, a method that accounts for over 80 percent of the entire volume of gathered information, particularly in the economic domain;

—The preconditioning of financial loans on the revealing of certain economic figures;

—The penetration of banks to gather economic data since they [the banks] represent a valuable source of such information, especially under the circumstances of no adequate data protection;

—The activity of foreign consulting companies, which by virtue of their business are offered access to secret information referring to enterprises, firms, and companies;

—The activity of certain private intelligence companies, which gather discrediting information about certain enterprises, and which sell that information to the competition;

—The use of the INTERNET, which represents an ideal intelligence method, as it ensures the transmission of secret information in every domain. This network is a connection of 15,000 subnetworks and links approximately 60 million users in 120 countries;

—The exploitation "in the dark" [exploatarea "in orb"] of the dialogue partners, a method that is used quite often;

—The activity of the intelligence services is being carried out via 200 foreign affairs centers and institutes, which, under the cover of offering logistical and financial support, are engaged in intelligence work.

Corruption and Mafia-Like Groupings

An economic and social scourge of the transition period, which is present in a quite menacing way in Romanian society, is the phenomenon of corruption, with a span from individual cases to entire segments of the authority and power bodies, and which alters the course established by law, the rule-of-law order, and the relations between the institutions meant to protect that order, that is, the police, the judiciary, the public prosecution, and, last but not least, the Romanian Intelligence Service.

An analysis of corruption, a basic cause of the economic and financial crisis Romanian society is going through, reveals the fact that its tentacles threaten to spread over three concentric subsystems, which interact among each other.

The first is that of "high-level" corruption, which has reached our national institutions by the bribing of some public servants or the involvement of some high-ranking officials in dubious dealings. Lately, the media has frequently unearthed such cases. Even if one suspects there are also other interests behind the anticorruption struggle, such as striking electoral capital, they cause significant moral damage as they lead to a so-called authority crisis of the institutions where such officials carry out their activity.

The second subsystem is specialized in the sphere of business life and is functioning thanks to the services offered by the officials involved in high-level corruption. Such cases include the granting of licenses, the rigging of tenders, the avoidance of customs duty regulations, and illegal import-export activities, and bank loans. Within a relatively short time period, an economic mafia appeared, with adequate nuclei acting at a regional level. The fact that the volume of the underground economy is assessed as reaching 35 to 40 percent of the gross domestic product proves that such parasite structures may be able to strangle or paralyze entire branches of our national economy, trigger chain reactions that are difficult to be kept under control, and affect broad social categories. The persons acting as nodes of the mafia-like networks were able to exert such activities due to the carelessness and incompetence, and especially the corruptness, of the employees of the institutions that had the legal duty to watch over the general prosperity of our society and to penalize severely those who are proven guilty of having made fortunes illegally by savagely plundering our national assets.

On the international plane, such events maintain an attitude of caution and reticence with respect to Romania's admittance as a full member of the European and euro-atlantic bodies.

The efficiency and the support granted from abroad to such parasite underground structures are also proved by the successful way in which persons belonging to the underworld strike profitable deals with international mafia-like networks, while Romania's official representatives abroad are made the target of genuine harassment and discrediting campaigns.

The expansion on Romanian territory of mafia-type organized crime structures involved in arms and drug trafficking, as well as illegal trade in merchandise that is subject to sale prohibition, the amplification of the immigration phenomenon to our country, especially that of persons coming from the Far and Middle East, with its entire load of fraud, corruption, radical fundamentalist religious belief, and terrorism have become facts, the social perils of which may reach a zenith if the au-

thority and thwarting strength of the specialized public institutions continues to decrease.

Corruption within the subsystem of isolated cases—bribes in the domain of schooling, health care, public services, and so on—seems to be less harmful, but the increasing frequency of such cases appears as a symptom of a decaying society.

The precarious way in which the police elaborated its investigation documents, on the one hand, as well as the cases in which courts failed to do their duty, on the other, so that the application of laws was carried out preferentially, depending on the persons under charge, generated a tide of mutual accusations on behalf of those two institutions. The fact that these interministerial reproaches were made known to the public in a way that lacked objectivity and equidistance and was rather biased by certain segments of the media, which are openly involved in political and backstage maneuvers, goes beyond the boundaries of political struggle and pursues the mere goal of accrediting the idea that a "general chaos" is gaining ground in Romania, making it move irrevocably away from the European standards.

Terrorism and Organized Crime

The increasingly ample and violent tide of international terrorism is also expanding to our country and is frequently offered support by organized crime networks.

These two scourges of the modern world represent, each in its turn, and so much the more in the concrete form they appear, major perils for the national security. The evolution of the current operative situation made it necessary that the vigilance and activity of our specialized bodies should concentrate on the following hotbeds of terrorist threat:

—The potential perils represented for our national security by the intent of the Romanian branch of the Workers Party of Kurdistan [PKK] to set up the Kurdish House, a cover under which they could coordinate the activity of the Kurdish extremists in our country, as well as to establish here the leadership nucleus of their eastern European organization. Aside from the tendency to turn our national territory into a scene of violent clashes, one should also consider the current methods used by the PKK, which are specific to organized crime, among which there is the smuggling of arms, ammunition, explosive materials, and so on;

—The consolidation of certain fundamentalist Islamic nuclei, especially at university centers, as well as that of the branch offices of certain powerful terrorist organizations, such as the Hizballah, the Muslim Brotherhood, or Hamas, and the tendency of the latter to exceed the phase of the proselytism and fanaticizing their followers, including certain native persons, with the goal of creating Muslim enclaves acting as "bridgeheads" for European fundamentalist terrorism. Fundamentalist groupings belonging to Hamas, dissident organizations composing the new Alliance of Palestinian Forces, are determined to initiate terrorist actions on Romanian territory as well as a sign of protest against the Middle East peace process;

—In Romania, there has been a proliferation of the networks of certain Asian organizations, such as the Japanese Red Army and the Triads, known for the violence of their actions in the domain of terrorism as well as organized crime.

Furthermore, the Russian and Ukrainian mafias have expanded their illegal operations over our country as well, increasing the danger of amplified drug-terror [narcoterrorism] and organized crime activity.

The major preoccupation of some of the aforementioned criminal groups consists, on the one hand, of the division of the territory and activity fields into various spheres of influence with the purpose of obtaining money from various company owners (by blackmail and violence), including under the pretext of offering them protection from the actions of isolated elements or rival gangs, and, on the other hand, in the attempts made by certain representatives of mafia-like networks to be appointed or elected to important offices (...)

Romania: Kurds Said To Plan Headquarters in Techirgiol

AU2703204996 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 21 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Cristian Ciocoiu: "The Mayor of Techirghiol Is Afraid That This District Will Become the Headquarters of the International Affairs of the Kurds"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Currently, Kurds are holding a meeting at Minerva Hotel in Techirgiol locality [on the Black Sea shore]. The meeting seems to be the secretly held "Annual conference of the Kurdish emigration," ROMPRES announces.

Eliza Paraschiv, the deputy mayor of the well-known spa, told the news agency that a group of Kurdish tourists rented the Minerva Hotel for three weeks and that "the atmosphere in town is very tense due to the rumors that these Kurds allegedly wish to establish the headquarters of their international affairs department in this remote area." The deputy mayor was not allowed to enter the hotel in order to verify whether the rumors are true.

At the same time, the border police at the Vama Veche border crossing arrested a Turkish citizen of Kurdish origin who tried to enter Romania with false documents.

Romania: Severin Analyzes Russian Duma's Decision

AU2803073996 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 18 Mar 96 p 8

[Interview with PD Vice President Adrian Severin, head of the Democratic Party electoral campaign, by Cristian Anghelache; place and date not given: "The Haste With Which the Romanian Government Has Announced the Possibility of Concluding a Romanian-Russian Treaty Is Suspicious"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Anghelache] Mr. Adrian Severin, what is your opinion about the recent decision of the Russian Federation's State Duma, whereby the act of the USSR's dismantlement is declared null and void?

[Severin] The recent decision of the State Duma regarding the annulment of the acts of dissolving the former Soviet Union represents a step of utmost seriousness in the context of the current situation. For the Democratic Party [PD], the aforementioned decision has a double significance: on the one hand, it means a return to the imperial spirit that led in the past to the establishment of a sphere of influence with negative effects on Romania's history; on the other hand, the empire that they are dreaming about again, as envisaged by the State Duma, will have to have a Soviet character, therefore, it means a return to a totalitarian form in the state structure of our neighbor.

Both ideas disseminated by the Duma, regardless of the fact that they will be implemented integrally or partially, represent factors of concern both for us as well as for the entire international community. Unfortunately, this event marked by the recent decision of the State Duma finds Romania in an extremely delicate situation, a situation of uncertainty and instability in the domestic economic and political arena and a situation of isolation in the international arena. The PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] has brought the country to the current situation of not having yet settled the relations with our western neighbors and has not created the necessary premises for Romania to become part of the integrated structures of euro-atlantic economic, political, and military security in the foreseeable future.

[Anghelache] How is the treaty that was concluded by Romania with Russia in 1991 perceived in the current situation?

[Severin] From this point of view, things seem to be pretty strange because that treaty became null and void when one of the partners vanished. On the other hand, this treaty was never ratified, so we might say that even if we were to witness a sudden emergence of the USSR, we still would not be able to talk about a retroactively valid treaty. However, what seems to me more dangerous and more suspicious is the haste with which the Romanian Government announced that there is a possibility for a new Romanian-Russian treaty to be signed just a few months before the general and presidential elections in Romania. Such a treaty cannot be concluded in haste and cannot be concluded in a state of electoral excitement. This haste makes me think of something else, namely the idea that those who, a few years ago, attempted to conclude a treaty with the USSR to limit Romania's capabilities to develop on the international plane and establish its alliances freely now wish to introduce the same old ideas in a new treaty with the Russian Federation before their mandate expires.

[Anghelache] How do you think that the recent decision of the State Duma will influence the relations between the Russian Federation and the Council of Europe?

[Severin] I am fully convinced that this declaration, even if its importance and effects have been minimized by President Boris Yeltsin, will produce serious feelings in the Council of Europe. Also similar feelings have to be produced by the recent declarations regarding a so-called noninterference of the Council of Europe in Russia's domestic affairs, while we are talking about the preservation of democratic standards and human rights throughout Russia and particularly regarding the Chechen crisis.

[Anghelache] What would happen if, by an absurd turn of events, this decision were implemented?

[Severin] It is very interesting that the decision of the State Duma does not speak about a future project—let us say the establishment of a confederation that would replace the former Soviet Union, a possible federation that would include the former union republics—but rather they are talking about the annulment of the act of dismantling the Soviet Union. From a judicial viewpoint, the annulment means a return to the situation that prevailed in the past, before the annulment of the act. Therefore, this means that, according to the idea of the Moscow politicians who supported this thesis, the countries that have detached themselves would be compelled to return to the USSR, and it would mean that their acts of independence were also considered null and void. This is the formal consequence of the act of annulment. No doubt these states will feel free to defend their independence. I do not doubt this! However, by defending independence, they will be placed in a relationship of tension with a major power, which might

try to put into effect the so-called rights that it believes it has and which would derive from the act of annulment. And we know what means were used by the USSR in the past to bring numerous territories within its borders.

Romania: UDMR's Marko Warns of Nationalism

AU2703175896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] During a press conference today held by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], Bela Marko, president of that political party, highlighted the perils posed by the exacerbation of certain nationalistic actions in the preelectoral period, which could divert the attention of public opinion from the genuine issues at stake in the coming elections.

Furthermore, the UDMR leadership assesses that the economic situation in Romania is critical, and the financial system on the brink of bankruptcy since the cabinet has not managed to implement its own governing program.

According to the opinion of the UDMR, in this electoral year, the current power will make use of all the means at its disposal to win the elections, a fact that could cause them to take certain social protection measures. However, if these lack sufficient basis, they might later on lead to grave financial consequences, reports our correspondent, Florin Lepadatu.

Romania: PSM's Paunescu To Ignore Vadim Tudor

AU2703181396 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 21 Mar 96 p 1

[MEDIAFAX Note: "Adrian Paunescu Decreed Embargo Against Vadim Tudor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The candidate for presidency of the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM], Adrian Paunescu, wrote in the Wednesday issue of the VREMEA daily that he will no longer say or write a single word about the candidate of the Greater Romania Party [PRM] to the same position, that is Corneliu Vadim Tudor, so as "not to participate in the degradation of the political climate." The unilateral embargo decreed by the socialist candidate is due to certain articles published in the ROMANIA MARE weekly, where Adrian Paunescu is accused of having reached an understanding with Dumitru Popa, director of Romanian Television, to censor C.V. Tudor and "thus rid himself of a candidate who, according to the public opinion polls, is better placed in the presidential race than him." Paunescu denies these accusations, which he considers "imbecile." The PSM candidate for the presidency claims that, at the January 1995 celebration of the VREMEA awards, Corneliu Vadim Tudor asked that the "left have a single candidate for the presidency, namely Ion Iliescu," but that later that year, he changed his mind and said that Iliescu "no longer has the right to run for the presidency." The VREMEA article, the writer points out, "is a farewell message" addressed to a "man who has often insulted the PSM."

Romania: PUNR Reasserts Will To Stay With PDSR

AU2703172896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 27 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] reasserts its will to contribute to the achievement of the goals established in the protocol concluded with the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], and not to exacerbate the significance of the divergence that has emerged. this is asserted, among other things, in a 10-point communique issued last night following an ordinary session of the PUNR Standing Bureau. The communique was read out today by Valer Suian, secretary general of that party, during the weekly news conference of the PUNR. [passage omitted]

Slovenia: Parliament Still Undecided on EU Platform

AU2803092696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0600 GMT 28 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Chamber devoted all of yesterday to the debate on Slovenia's accession to the European Union and relations with Italy. In the afternoon, following the interruption of the session, the deputies did not get any closer to the vote on the proposed platforms by the government and the committee for international relations, that is, to a decision whether or not Slovenia would accept the Spanish compromise proposal and thus agree to the EU demands. Apart from the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Democrats, other parliamentary groups more or less openly rejected the proposal that we would agree to special conditions for associate membership.

The State Chamber will today continue the third day of the extraordinary session at which it is supposed to adopt the amended version of the platform and the conclusions on relations with the EU, Italy, and NATO.

Slovenia: Deputies Question Government EU Platform

AU2703171096 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 27 Mar 96

[Report by Nadja Pengov on an extraordinary State Chamber session on Slovene foreign policy held in Ljubljana on 27 Mar—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pengov] Is the European Union our sole goal, or merely one of the goals that can also wait? What will be the message that the parliament sends to Europe today? Judging from today's debate, the majority of the deputies have not warmed up to the government's proposals and the Spanish compromise.

Democrat France Bucar calls for caution. Is Slovenehood real and does it still make any sense? He believes it does. The European Union is also not a paradise whose doors Italy is barring to us. All the European powers are competing in seizing up our territory, and Italy is only a part of this circle, with a policy that has remained unaltered throughout history. According to Bucar, we should also consider whether under the conditions dictated for accession to the Union we preserve Slovenehood. And also:

[Bucar] The problem of land is an entirely different issue for Slovenia than it is for the big countries.

[Pengov] He was supported by Jozef Kopse, an independent deputy, and also Maria Poszonec, a deputy of the Hungarian minority. Foreign Minister Thaler, as he said, was aware of the danger, but was convinced that we would be able to negotiate on a more equal footing once we are within the European Union. He also said:

[Thaler] My belief, based on everything that I know, have studied, and follow, is that the Slovenehood is in the medium and long run better protected within the European Union than outside it.

[Pengov] The foreign minister also maintains, with full responsibility, that the time is now for a decision between Europe and Slovenia as a part of the Balkans.

However, Janez Kocijancic [United List of Social Democrats] is calling for caution, too. He says that there are no European standards in the realm of real estate, as the government claims. What was proposed contains the following trap:

[Kocjancic] We will live in the belief that we fulfilled the EU demands, and adapted to certain standards, and then anyone who had the time and inclination would explain to us which standards in particular he had in mind.

Zare Pregelj from the People's Party said: Europe is not the sole option, especially in the absence of economic instruments. If the government cannot create them, it should close the case and leave the matter to its successor. The European Union has time and Slovenia must make some for itself, too.

Slovenia: Drnovsek Calls for End to Physicians' Strike

AU2803090096 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0600 GMT 28 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The strike of physicians and dentists has run into its eighth day. The negotiations between Fides trade unions and the government negotiating team will continue after the government session this afternoon, at which, according to Prime Minister Drnovsek's assurances at a recent news conference, the government will pass a law on physicians that is supposed to regulate physicians' status in the long term.

The outcome of the negotiations is uncertain even today as Fides stands firm in its demand for an annex stipulating a 1.5 quotient [of the average salary in the private sector] to the professional collective agreement, which the government maintains is too high.

The positions to be debated in today's negotiations will first be studied by the chief strike committee, which includes Fides representatives from all over Slovenia. At Fides's invitation a representative of the European Federation of Public Sector Physicians will also visit Slovenia today. First he will visit the hospital in Izola

and afterward a medical center and the Clinical Center in Ljubljana.

Let us also add that Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek met with Health Minister Bozidar Voljc and Clinical Center Director General Primoz Rode yesterday. They discussed the Fides trade union strike. On that occasion the prime minister admitted that the demands of the physicians were justified, however, he emphasized that the government could not exceed the realistic limits of the public finances available and for that reason the continuation of the strike would be senseless and would hurt the physicians, the government, and the citizens alike.

Slovenia: SLOVENEC Suspends 3 Reporters

AU2703152696 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 21 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Vodusek: "Reporters Unwillingly Left Outside Editorial Office"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 20 March—Janez Obreza, editor in chief of SLOVENEC and director of the company, on the grounds of "violation of the competition clause," yesterday ordered the suspension of three reporters of this publishing house: Marcel Koprol, Ivo Zajdela, and Marjeta Komelj-Snoj.

He said the reporters were removed from work yesterday and the suspension will remain in force until the final ruling, namely, a disciplinary procedure "for a grave violation of work obligations" has also been instigated against the three. For the duration of the suspension, they will receive half of their salaries.

Janez Obreza, director and editor in chief of SLOVENEC, decided on such radical measures after he received the first issue of the Social Democratic paper DAN in the parliament last week, in which SLOVENEC journalists also participated with their articles. The articles were signed by Ivo Zajdela; Marjeta Komelj-Snoj, the editor of the culture column; Milena Vehor, contract contributor to this column; and Pavle Fajdiga, who is also employed by SLOVENEC, however, but whom no disciplinary measures were taken. The majority of the articles were unsigned or signed with a pseudonym.

For the time being, the proprietors of SLOVENEC have decided to take measures only against those who signed the articles with their full names. "We cannot tolerate reporters employed by our newspaper writing for the competition during office hours on our computers and for our money," Obreza said, commenting on the suspension decision. When checking the computers in SLOVENEC, they found 16 articles published in DAN, which means that the journalists of SLOVENEC in effect created another paper. The management believes that DAN was created in their office, with their technology, their paper, and most likely with their editors.

Marcel Koprol did not write for DAN; however, on 23 December 1995, he published a commentary entitled "Eating Away At the Foundations" on page 2 of DNEVNIK although the competition clause of the employment agreement applied to him. Director Janez Obreza said Koprol committed several serious violations of work obligations. Following the session of the paper's expanded collegium last September, contrary to the agreement, he wrote in his editorial "Richer, Fairer, More Interesting" that the paper would be enlivened by color photographs and a new visual image. This sort of writing did not conform to the agreements, and the false announcement met with a negative reaction of the reporters and caused moral and material damage.

One of the reasons for the suspension of Ivo Zajdela was also his contribution to NOVA REVIJA in December 1995, in which he published an article entitled "Stop Janez Jansa," the contents of which dealt with the political situation in Slovenia, the relations of the Slovene Christian Democrats [SKD] with other parties, and the behavior of individual SKD members. As the explanation of the disciplinary procedure reads, he spread utterly biased, tendentious, and false claims about one of the members of the SLOVENEC enterprise from the SKD and about SLOVENEC's editorial policy.

[Box, p 2]

Reporters and employees of SLOVENEC today adopted a declaration in which they write that they are indignant at the coarseness and enraged by the manner and the procedure by which the management of the house yesterday prevented Zajdela, Komelj, and Koprol from entering the editorial office because such actions are a disgrace for the paper.

Federal

FRY: Foreign Ministry Official Interviewed

WS2603110796 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 19 Mar 96 p 7

[Interview with Zhivadin Jovanovic, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by Ryszard Bilski; place and date not given: "Peace in Bosnia Requires Dialogue, Not Weapons"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bilski] The enforced process of solving the Yugoslav conflict in a peaceful way continues. Do you believe in its success? Do you believe that the now constructed peace will last for decades? Will the Serbs, who have undergone exodus twice—first the panicky escape from Krajina, then from Sarajevo—and now they are threatened with a third exodus, from East Slavonia, when the region returns to the Republic of Croatia, will they put up with that? What is your opinion about the lifting of the embargo on weapon sales to Bosnia?

[Jovanovic] The most important is that we believe in the chances of peace and stabilization for there has been enough killing and suffering, enough destruction and vandalism. I hope that a similar view is held by the other parties to the conflict, who have suffered great sacrifice and loss—just as we have. The solutions worked out in Dayton are not perfect, but they have been accepted because there is no alternative to peace. This is also the opinion of all Europe and the world since a spreading conflict in Yugoslavia could threaten us with serious destabilization in the Balkans. That is why President Bill Clinton initiated the Dayton process. Unfortunately, I cannot allay your anxiety over the numerous threats to the peace process.

I will start with the most painful and difficult question: the return of refugees. It is being put off, and that is worrying. The number of refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] has reached 700,000; 500,000 of them are exiles and refugees from Krajina, and 200,000 are from Bosnia-Herzegovina. What is needed is political commitment on the part of the leaders of the new states that were formed as a result of the split up of the old FRY; also needed is the steady involvement and support of the international community. Then those who were exiled or who escaped to save their lives might be able to return to their home countries, if they wished. The Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees has informed me that already as many as 30,000 refugees fror Krajina and West Slavonia have given notice they are willing to return.

Another very serious threat to the peace process could be posed by the uneven treatment of participants in the conflict. It is very risky if someone wants to supply the Croatian and Muslim Federation's army with additional weapons in order to counterbalance the current situation. This could initiate an arms race in the former Yugoslavia and in the Balkans. Still in Europe there are better ways to reach a balance: one is reducing the surplus armaments, thus bringing equalibrium in the military potentials. The peace process does not require weapons but dialogue.

Another threat are provocations planned by extremists from all sides. The already mentioned will to supply the Croatian and Muslim Federation's army with additional weapons could be "a spark" for such instigators.

What could also impede the peace process is postponement of free and democratic elections in Bosnia as well as putting off the restoration and rebuilding of the country. I would like to stress that the territory of the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina, and all parts of the territory—no matter who inhabits it—should be treated in the same way by politicians and investors alike.

[Bilski] After the removal of the Security Council sanctions, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia now aims to return to international institutions—political, economic and others. What is your view of that process?

[Jovanovic] We happily welcome all efforts of the international community to create the appropriate conditions for our return. We estimate the direct costs of these sanctions at $50 billion, and the indirect ones—at $100 billion. The costs born by our neighbors reach another $50 billion. [all figures in this graph as published] Our return to political and economic normalcy has a stabilizing influence for the situation in the entire Balkans and in Europe, for it would be difficult to imagine solving the numerous questions around us without some participation on the part of Belgrade.

I wish to stress that we did not leave any international organization; we were only "temporarily absent," and this was not our decison. Now we intend to return. I believe that the return of the FRY to the OSCE will take place soon. After the talks we had on 15 March in Warsaw, I believe that we have a friendly attitude and support on the part of the Polish government, including as regards our return to the Central European Initiative.

Over 10 ambassadors have already returned to Belgrade, including the Chinese, French and Russian. We also have initiated diplomatic relations with the Vatican.

[Bilski] Are former trading partners returning to Serbia and Montenegro as well?

[Jovanovic] Yes, and even more eagerly than diplomats. The hotels are virtually full. Industrialists and businessmen are coming from Austria, Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, Greece, Italy and many other countries. We are also awaiting Polish capital, especially joint ventures that could help us make up quickly for the technological delay caused by the war and sanctions. I would remind you that the value of the turnover between the former Yugoslavia and Poland had reached around $1 billion, out of which $600 million came from contacts with Serbia and Montenegro, that is, the present FRY. In the nearest future, a review of Polish-Yugoslav agreements is planned. Also, the signing of new agreements is being prepared, including those on protection and support of investments and the avoidance of double taxation. We are ready to restore free transit with Poland.

[Bilski] The international community is waiting for mutual recognition among the former Yugoslav republics. This is, among other things, a condition for freeing up bank deposits. Meanwhile, a normalization of conditions between the states that resulted from the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY] proceeds at a slow pace. Why?

[Jovanovic] I also think that normalization should be done effectively, but this is a very complicated process. It is impossible to close an old chapter and open a new one by the power of one decision. Mutual recognition requires, after all, the clearing up and settling of affairs that were the basis for the military conflict and the breakup of the SFRY. Not everything depends on Belgrade. For example, we waited for three years for a response from Slovenia to our official note recognizing that former Yugoslav republic as an independent sovereign state. We recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina on 14 December 1995 (the signing of the Dayton agreement). Our recent talks with Skopje have been especially fruitful, and I hope that soon it will sign an agreement.

Relations between the FRY and the Republic of Croatia are especially meaningful for the peace process. In November last year the ministers of foreign affairs of both states initialed a plan for such an agreement and we hoped that it would be signed in Dayton, but this did not happen, though this was not Belgrade's fault. But the matter has not been left on the shelf. The chiefs of diplomacy of the FRY and Croatia have met twice, first in Belgrade and then in Zagreb. Agreements have already been signed on opening of the oil pipeline, resumption of postal services, and road, rail and air transport. Rights of the offices representing the interests of each side in Belgrade and Zagreb have been expanded; now they also have the role of consultants. Patient dialogue brings results. International organizations, including the financial ones, should recognize and appreciate the intentions of the partners, as well as the establishing of bilateral ties. We have, as I believe, the right to expect the freeing up of the deposits in foreign banks especially because these are not funds of governments and politicians but of companies.

[Bilski] What will be, in your opinion, the criteria for establishing the share of each of the former republics in the property of [the former] federation as well as in the repayment of common debts of the former SFRY?

[Jovanovic] There is no need to establish any special rules for that. Documents exist; it is known who has taken how much from the treasury of the federation, and what they used the money for, as well as who is now using the investments that were covered by the federation's budget and foreign loans. The head of the National Bank of Yugoslavia has recently suggested organizing a meeting of the interested parties, where it would be established who is entitled to what and what are their liabilities. We do not want anybody else's property, but we are also not going to make gifts since we ourselves are in need.

[Bilski] Belgrade's distancing itself from Bosnian Serbs—demonstrated in the case of the economic blockade—has helped to prepare and initiate the peace process in Bosnia. What is the current Belgrade attitude toward the Serbian Republic? Do you consider it possible to join the territory with Serbia, or to create a confederation of the state of Bosnian Serbs with the FRY?

[Jovanovic] In the same way I do not see any obstacles for joining the Croatian and Muslim Federation to the Republic of Croatia, I do not see why the Republic of Serbia would not be able to join the FRY. But this depends upon the decision of the inhabitants of these new states.

[Bilski] The situation in Kosovo is still far from normal. Minister, do you see chances of a compromise being reached between Serbs and Albanians? What are the concessions that Belgrade is ready to make, and what concessions would you expect from the Albanian side?

[Jovanovic] The situation in Kosovo is not as bad as people say and write about. Keen and objective observers know that. Well, the first foreign investment ($70 million) made after the lifting of the sanctions was in Kosovo, not somewhere else. According to our estimates, Albanian extremists who aim at separating Kosovo from Bosnia are losing support. Many Albanians are already tired of politicking and rejecting everything that comes from Serbia. Albanian opposition leaders wish, therefore, to internationalize the "Kosovo

question," but they have no greater success, for the international community speaks of preserving the integrity of the Republic of Serbia, regarding it as the main condition for peace in the Balkans.

FRY: War Crimes Prosecutor Calls FRY 'Criminal State'

AU2803132096 Paris AFP in English 1304 GMT 28 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, March 28 (AFP)—A UN war-crimes prosecutor on Thursday branded the rump Yugoslavia as a "criminal" state because it was aiding indicted war criminals.

Prosecutor Clint Williamson told the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia here that "when a government gives refuge and support to criminals in the eyes of the world that government then too becomes criminal.

"And that is exactly what the Belgrade government has done in this case," he said. The rump Yugoslavia comprises Serbia and its tiny Montenegrin ally.

FRY: Rehn Human Rights Reports Viewed as 'Balanced'

LD2503183996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1803 GMT 25 Mar 96

["Pool" item by Stevan Cordas]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Mar 25 (TANJUG)—The special U.N. rapporteur for human rights in the former Yugoslavia Elisabeth Rehn is to present to the 52nd session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission on April 11 her second report on her three missions in the region.

U.N. sources said the date was not yet officially confirmed.

Unofficial sources said the Human Rights Commission was already discussing a draft resolution on the former Yugoslavia to be adopted at the end of this year's session. The draft is based on Rehn's report, parts of which have already been made public.

The draft is being drawn up by the U.S., as in the past three years.

Earlier resolutions, based on reports submitted by the human rights rapporteur at the time Tadeusz Mazowiecki (Poland), were not in the least favorable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Intensive consultations on the draft are underway in Geneva, and unofficial reports indicate that key findings made by Rehn have been included in it.

This could mean that the new resolution might be more objective and favorable to FRY than the one adopted last year.

Rehn's reports, unlike her predecessor's, are based on facts rather than on her own views, in other words it is clear that she wishes to present a balanced report giving equal coverage to FRY, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

One of the essential conclusions that could be drawn from Rehn's second report is that the human rights situation is not satisfactory anywhere in the former Yugoslavia.

According to her findings however, the situation is the most difficult in Bosnia and Croatia, where human rights are being violated in a drastic manner.

FRY: Military Ties to Russia, Arms Import Viewed

AU2603124696 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 15 Mar 96 pp 15-16

[Article by Vladimir Jovanovic: "Russia-Serbia via Montenegro"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Belgrade last month the Russian Foreign Minister signed a protocol on military cooperation. Many concluded that this was another in the series of Russian Federation attempts to restore the Warsaw Pact in some form. It is believed that the Defense Ministry of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] made additional agreements with Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Belarus at the recommendation of the Russians. Russian General Pavel Gratchev arrived in Belgrade for the second time, this time with more concrete plans than the ones from summer 1994, when he tried to give Serbs guarantees on the occasion of the debate on the Contact Group's plan. After the personnel changes in Moscow's diplomatic leadership, the opposition to NATO's intentions to also set up a system of European security in the eastern part of the continent has been strengthened. At the same time, this has strengthened the "confusion" in Belgrade regarding the dilemmas in connection with the eventual association of Serbia in the "Partnership for Peace" program.

This "confusion" of Belgrade's, however, is already seen as a determined policy. In the same line of thought as Serbia wanting to strengthen its diplomatic position in the post-Dayton period by increasing the Russian presence in the region, there is also the never-denied plan that the Montenegrin coast (the Bay of Boka Kotorska) is, in some way, supposed to become a base for Russian naval forces. A group of vessels including the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov were supposed to enter the Adriatic Sea as part of the plan in support of the

peace process. Specifically, an airborne brigade, based in IFOR's [Implementation Force] sector A in northeast Bosnia-Herzegovina. The vessels have not come to the Adriatic for financial reasons.

According to the plan, the Kuznetsov is to fulfill the coalition approach of Russia and NATO in the building of trust after accepting the peace agreements. This modern vessel (displacement of 67,000 tons, with 24 Suhoj 28B2/25 airplanes, or 12 MiG-29 jets, as well as 15 K-27 Helix helicopters) was supposed to be located in the south Adriatic zone, with a logistics base in the bay of Boka Kotorska. That this has not gone through sounds convincing from a financial point of view. Moving the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov and the other vessels from their Black Sea base is an extremely expensive task. The rocket cruiser Kirov, which is part of the aircraft carrier's group, when at full power, uses up enough electricity to power the lighting of a town with 500,000 inhabitants!

There are, of course, some purely political hypotheses that explain why the Russian aircraft carrier has not yet come to the Adriatic. The range is wide: from Turkey's imposing a more rigid regime of shipping upon Russian vessels traveling through the Bosphorus, to Mediterranean NATO members' fear of an increased Russian influence, to NATO's general desire to maintain the dominating position in the Mediterranean, after the Russian Fifth Naval Squadron left the area many years ago. They would like to do this through its permanent forces in the Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED, formed on 30 April 1992) and the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet. The Russian Federation's plans to restore their influence on this side of the Carpathian Mountains to a greater or lesser extent, do not seem to be discouraged by this. Moreover, Serbia itself is seen as the point of regional expansion for deconstruction regarding Western plans, symbolized by the "Partnership for Peace." Russian-Serb military connections are seen as "organic" because of the technical-technological reliance of the so-called Yugoslav Army on Russian military industry. Furthermore, they both have almost identical views on the process of establishing a new balance of power in Europe, as well as a chronic nostalgia for the Cold War era. Unofficial announcements that Serbia is to receive certain amounts of Russian weaponry therefore have to be seen in this context.

It seems that this is the most significant import of Russian military equipment since 1988, when the Commander of the Yugoslav Air Force at that time, General Anton Tus, made the agreement to purchase a MiG-29 squadron. Since then there have been no publicly acknowledged transactions between the Minister of War [as published], General Veljko Kadijevic, and the conspiratory [as published] group of General Dmitri Yazov, which implied Russian military aid (mysterious military shipments that were arriving at the Bar Port, etc.). The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have, through the protocol in Belgrade, taken on the obligation to deliver a squadron of Mi-24 helicopters, a squadron of MiG-29 jets, and an unknown number of ballistic missiles. This is to be done on account of their Serb wheat debt. Perhaps the import of military aircraft itself would not arouse significant interest, however, when ballistic missiles are in question, the whole matter is moving toward this being a new encouragement of Belgrade's dangerous ambitions.

Ballistic missiles are, according to American military terminology, intended for operative-tactical and tactical assignments. In short, this covers all missiles smaller than the strategic-intercontinental ones. In the example of Russian exports to Serbia, one can certainly speak of the C-300 type missiles (a variation of the American Patriot missile), but also of the realization of the old desires of the Belgrade military chiefs to also import surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, whose range can be increased by making modifications and using different rocket fuels. Apart from explosives, their warheads can also be filled with military poisons.

The Chief of the General Staff in spring 1993, Zivota Panic, visited Iraq secretly (which was discovered through a public scandal), inquiring about Iraqi technological experience on this matter. The Iraqis made missiles based on the Russian Scud type, but even more effective, which were launched at neighboring countries during the period of "Desert Storm." This refers to the tactical ballistic missiles Al-Abas, whose warhead mass is 250 kg and which has a range of 900 km, and Al-Hussein, with a warhead mass of 400 kg and a range of 600 km.

Serbia has a technological capacity capable of improving the basic Russian missile models (especially in sections of the Krusik factory in Valjevo and Merima in Krusevac). It is believed, however, that work on these projects would be supported by Russian military experts that would be brought in to assist the already existing teams of the Zarkov Aircraft-Technical Institute. What remains, therefore, is the question of transportation of the Russian military cargo to Serbia, which seems to have been taken care of last week. At least part of the shipment will go through the Bar Port. The signatory of the agreement with general Grachev, Minister of Defense Pavle Bulatovic, made a deal in Bar which, apart from other things, foresees that the so-called Yugoslav Navy will "temporarily use part of the operative coast of the Bar Port." The plan for the unloading was already thought of in 1991: Ships with dismantled Russian mili-

tary cargo would arrive at the port and be transported by rail to Serbia, where it would be assembled and made operational. The fact that similar "transports of death" announced a bloody conflict five years ago may mean more than just dark thoughts this time around.

So far nothing has come out of the matter indirectly mentioned by Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic in the Pentagon and at the British Ministry of Defense, according to which the Bar Port would be used as a logistical center for IFOR [Implementation Force]. However, the tarnishing military transit through Montenegro could threaten Podgorica's diplomatic efforts of the last few months. Will Montenegro be a coast of the Russian sea?

[Box, p 17]

Without the Suhoj

The purchase of modern weaponry for the Air Force and for antiaircraft defense was also announced by the commander of this army branch, General Ljubisa Velickovic, not long ago. A modernization, from the technical point of view, will be the import of the Russian multipurpose helicopter Mi-24, which represents an counterpart to the American AH-64 Apache. This helicopter is armed with a 7,62-mm machine gun, a 23/4-mm cannon, and a quadruple [cetverocjevni] rocket launcher. It is superior to the Yugoslav Gazelle helicopters, which were assembled in the Sokol factory in Mostar. The Mi-24 helicopter has already turned up on the Yugoslav battlefields on the Croatian side, mainly in antitank and scouting activity.

The import of new MiG's is really the second phase of an agreement made 10 years ago to modernize the Yugoslav Air Force. Serbian flight personnel for these planes is mainly located within the 252d squadron based in Batajnica (Belgrade). However, the personnel for the new imports will have to go to Russia for schooling, due to the fact that the secret Russian instructional assistance has been considered temporary and incomplete for the past couple of years. It seems that Belgrade has, for now, given up its intention to introduce the newest generation of the Suhoj airplanes into the Air Force. This is because it does not have the money to invest into the accompanying maintenance sections, nor for the schooling of the technical personnel. Apart from that, the amount of money owed by Russia is decreasing, and it is yet to be seen whether the debt will be taken care of through this transaction. At the same time, by purchasing expensive spare parts and paying for repairs, the Serb economy will still be forced to cover the maintenance costs of the imported weaponry through compensation.

FRY: Arkan To Stand in Parliamentary Elections

LD2603212796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1351 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 26 Mar (TANJUG)—Zeljko Raznjatovic [also known as Arkan, a Serb paramilitary leader], chairman of the Party of Serb Unity [SSJ], said today that his party will take part in this year's elections for parliamentary seats in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], Montenegro, and the [Bosnian] Serb Republic because it wishes to campaign by parliamentary means for a unified Serb state.

At a news conference, he said that the SSJ is a party of the center and will not lean either to the left or the right.

Expressing the hope that there will not be any more fighting, Raznjatovic said the SSJ will concentrate on the struggle for the parliamentary unification of the Serb states.

According to him, the SSJ will focus on Kosmet [Kosovo-Metohija], "which is currently facing internal and external threats." The SSJ dos not pose a threat to loyal Albanians because "it wants peace and love among peoples" and is fighting to ensure that no one in Kosmet is a second-class citizen.

The news conference was also attended by Raznjatovic's wife, Svetlana, chairman of the "Third Child" aid organization. She recalled the organization's program and activities, the basic aim of which is to campaign against the decline in the birth rate in the FRY and the Serb Republic.

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic, Bildt on Need for Confidence Building

LD2803003396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0019 GMT 28 Mar 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 27 (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic received in Belgrade late on Wednesday the international community's high representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina Carl Bildt.

The meeting focused on the implementation of the civilian part of the Bosnian peace accord.

The world community should accelerate work on concrete financial help, which in turn should help along the repatriation of refugees and the consolidation of the

overall situation in both the Serb and the Muslim-Croat entities in Bosnia, it was heard during the talk.

This will intensify also preparations for the election [words indistinct] in Bosnia-Herzegovina, both sides said.

They agreed that these institutions would normalise the situation, stabilise peace and create conditions for the process of confidence-building between the people in the (Bosnian Serb state) Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation to succeed.

Special stress was laid on the need for the local bodies and institutions as well as the competent international factors to assume full responsibility for the protection of the rights and freedoms of the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina the safety of person and property.

The meeting was attended by Milan Milutinovic, foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Federation of Serbia and Montenegro).

Serbia: U.S. Military Aid for Federation Questioned

AU2803094496 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 21 Mar 96 p 5

[Article by Milan Bozokin: "A Balance According to an American Recipe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In order to secure the balance of military forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United States has decided to arm and train the forces of the Muslim-Croat Federation so that they can defend themselves from eventual attacks after NATO forces leave Bosnia at the end of the year. The Americans are primarily thinking of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslim army; no one is even mentioning the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], so one gets the impression that the Federation is only being mentioned as a facade for the actions and procedures that Washington has to implement in order to militarily strengthen Alija Izetbegovic's army.

Even during the talks in Dayton, the Americans promised the Sarajevo government that they would help militarily to establish a balance of power between Sarajevo and the better armed and equipped Serb Republic army. The army of Alija Izetbegovic is the largest of all three sides in Bosnia, but it is the poorest armed.

An Efficient Professional Army

According to MILITARY BALANCE, a publication of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina army has 31 tanks (T-34 and T-35), 100 pieces of artillery (130 and 203 mm), two 262 mm multiple rocket launchers, 200 mortar weapons (82 and 120 mm), surface-to-air missiles SA-7 and SA-14, and five MI-6 and MI-8 helicopters. On the other hand, the Serb Republic army has 275 tanks, 730 heavy artillery weapons, 900 mortar weapons, 20 fighter planes, and 24 military helicopters. The Croat forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina have 100 tanks, 200 artillery weapons, 300 mortar weapons, and 30 multiple rocket launchers. Because of such a distribution of arms, Alija Izetbegovic wanted the arms embargo against the Muslims lifted. However, many sources have pointed out that weapons for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims have been arriving through secret channels from Islamic countries. However, even this was not enough for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army to achieve any major successes on the battlefields.

The controversial military assistance for the Muslim-Croat Federation would cost $700-800 million, of which the United States is to contribute $100 million. U.S. officials have mentioned on a number of occasions that the training and arming of Federation soldiers will not begin until the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government in Sarajevo stops cooperating with Iran. This position has been confirmed by the U.S. Senate, which has asked for confirmation from President Clinton that the mujahidin and intelligence agents have left Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Experts from the Institute for Military Analysis in Virginia have developed two plans of Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslim and Croat military needs. According to the first plan, the Federation forces will be able to defend themselves from eventual attacks after IFOR [Implementation Force] leaves Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Federation Army would receive 45 tanks, 80 armored vehicles, 144 mobile artillery weapons, 170 surface-to-air missiles, 120 armor-piercing projectiles, 130 mortar weapons, radar equipment, and other pieces of equipment worth approximately $800 million. The second plan includes a smaller number of missiles and excludes helicopters; it would cost around $600 million. According to the plan, the Muslim and Croat armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina would unite, about 200,000 soldiers would be demobilized, and a professional army of 55,000 would be formed.

The Conflict Between Europe and the United States

In order to ensure the necessary resources, the United States has organized a conference on the arming of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Ankara, Turkey. Instead of the expected success, the conference turned into a fiasco. The difference in the European and American attitudes on this subject was clearly expressed in Ankara. The European Union participated as an observer at the meeting. Thus, it let Washington know clearly that, at this point, it considers the U.S. initiative improper and inappropriate, to say the least. Namely, the EU believes

that for the pacification of the Bosnia-Herzegovina area, it is necessary to first create a balance of military power. It agrees with the United States on this matter. However, while Washington regards the balance of power with an increase in the level of armament, the Europeans believe that the balance has to be set up on the present level—all this just before the beginning of the negotiations that are intended to lead to an arms limitation of not only the former warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina but all the one-time republics of the former SFRY. These negotiations are to be organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna.

Due to the obvious differences, the Ankara conference could not have produced any results. It will also be remembered because this was the first time after the Dayton agreement that the U.S. and European opinions differed. Of the 29 countries that participated at the Ankara conference, 11 were from the Islamic world, but only the United States promised to give $100 million for the arming and training of the Muslim-Croat Federation.

So the following question needs to be asked: Why do the Americans insist on the training and arming of primarily the Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims and, at the same time, the Croats but devote so little of their attention to carrying out the civilian part of the Dayton and Paris agreements. While Carl Bildt has to go through much trouble to get money for the civilian police and the restoration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United States, on the other hand, is offering dollars and military help to the party that can easily misuse this aid and damage the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was attained with so much difficulty. The situation is a bit more clear if we keep in mind that the United States is fulfilling the military part of the program that will end, by some strange coincidence, at the same time as the presidential elections in the United States. Europe, on the other hand, has been left with the civilian part of the plan. Even the opinion that Washington is deliberately doing this is not far from the truth because, according to current information, the Americans want to remove Bildt and replace him with one of their own people.

Serbia: Arkan Disbands Paramilitaries

AU2803114396 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 27 Mar 96 p 24

[Report by BETA: "The Serbian Voluntary Guard Is Being Disbanded"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade—Zeljko Raznatovic, president of the Serbian Unity Party, said yesterday that the process of demobilizing the Serbian Voluntary Guard was under way "as the war is behind us, and it is quite clear that the Srem-Baranja region will be part of Croatia next year." [passage omitted]

Serbia: Court Orders Release of Sandzak SDA Activists

AU2603215496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The activists of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] of Sandzak who were sentenced at a staged political trial were released in Novi Pazar today. The Novi Pazar District Court had sentenced 24 Bosniaks to six years in prison each. However, that was a staged political process and they were unfounded prison sentences, it was said in the defense lawyers' appeals to the Supreme Court of Serbia. The decision to release the members and activists of the Sandzak SDA followed after the Serbian Supreme Court Council meeting at which appeals to sentences were decided upon.

Serbia: Article Views Political Situation in Sandzak

AU2803105196 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Mar 96 p 5

[Article by Safeta Bisevac: "Comrade Ferid Will Be Part of the Serbian Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ferid Hamidovic, one of the more prominent members of the Yugoslav Left [JUL] branch in Novi Pazar, a man who has "remained a communist even when everyone else was leaving the party," has recently been appointed deputy republican environment minister. Although his appointment is still unknown to the wide Sandzak masses, traditionally disinterested for events in the faraway metropolis, the far better informed leaders of the Muslim parties see in all this a political game, a manipulative gesture through which Belgrade is trying to impose certain "honest" Muslims and thus win Muslim votes in the forthcoming elections.

Hamidovic, for years a leader in the Yugoslav youth organization who, as he himself says, rather spent his time working on youth projects than attending political meetings, at one point resigned as secretary of the Novi Pazar Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] council due to the "victory of the nationalist faction" in the council and moved to Belgrade to join the League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia. His appointment has also been interpreted as proof of JUL's significant role in appointing and removing officials in Novi Pazar.

Almost all promotions and removals in Novi Pazar, even those in the local SPS, are linked to JUL, in spite of the fact that the party stressed that its influence was often

overestimated. Of course, the significance of Gorica Gajevic, SPS secretary general and one-time president of the Raska court, cannot be discounted. In her own birthplace, and particularly in areas with a majority Muslim population, Gajevic communicates much better with JUL leaders than with the leaders of her own party, whose frequent nationalistic forays she sharply criticized.

JUL's Television Program

Ferid Hamidovic interprets his appointment to the republican government as "opening up rather than just window dressing" and "the beginning of a rebuilding of trust, as in the past few years not a single Muslim could go that far in Belgrade." The new deputy environment minister believes that the proffered hand should not be rejected but accepted; he will moreover strive for the maintenance of traditional Sandzak tolerance and interethnic understanding.

Hamidovic's appointment can also be interpreted as a clear sign of whom Belgrade is counting on in Sandzak. Another indicative sign is the fact that the authorities have refused to continue negotiations—initiated last summer—with Rasim Ljajic, president of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] in Sandzak. They are obviously backing another player.

JUL's role in Novi Pazar is obvious from the fact that the party has every chance at succeeding in areas where many others previously failed. This primarily pertains to the information system, which many people in the town find unsatisfactory.

Novi Pazar is one of the few towns in Serbia that does not have a local television station, but it does have a record number of satellite dishes per capita. So far entrepreneurs' attempts to obtain licenses for private radio and television stations have been unsuccessful. The most prominent example is that of Rusdija Sabotic, who three years ago founded and, without obtaining a license, for almost a full month broadcast a satellite program on his SAN television. The authorities reacted and banned the station.

JUL will soon try to succeed where Sabotic failed. It has launched an initiative to found Novi Pazar television, which would "objectively inform the public." Since the idea of local television has support among certain SPS leaders, it seems that Novi Pazar will soon get a television station, which will have a tough task competing with satellite, Croatian, and Bosnian television programs popular in the area.

Nonetheless, JUL's priority is not in the information area or in personnel policy, claims Zuhra Mumdzic, president of the Novi Pazar JUL council, but in the "affirmation of interethnic tolerance in Sandzak and in resisting both Muslim and Serbian nationalistic parties."

Ljajic-Ugljanin

Deprived either through their own or someone else's wishes of political communication with Belgrade, the Muslim parties have continued to occupy themselves with the usual problems of emigration of Sandzak Muslims, human rights violations, autonomy projects, and relations with "our mother state Bosnia-Herzegovina." There is less and less talk of divisions on the Muslim political scene since the parties involved in the conflict are trying to prove that their side has won and that others do not even exist.

Nevertheless, the political conflict between the undoubtedly leading Sandzak politicians Sulejman Ugljanin and Rasim Ljajic, which not even the Bosnian leadership could iron out, continues to be the main characteristic of the Muslim political scene. Since the obvious reason for their conflict lies in the different methods of political struggle and the fact that Ljajic is not giving up on his autonomy project, the realization of which he sees through solving concrete issues in negotiations with Belgrade and which his opponent currently finds unacceptable, it is clear that there will be no progress in their political relations any time soon.

Ugljanin's part of the SDA, gathered around the Muslim National Council of Sandzak, are not giving up on their Memorandum on the Establishment of a Special Status for Sandzak, which the domestic media and the opposition and ruling structures have assessed as a separatist document. Serbian parties believe that the seeds of separatism lie in too great autonomy in the judiciary, police, government, assembly and governor—that is, in the actual state status, which an autonomy organized in this way would have.

Fear of Emigration

In November 1995, "19 Bosniak parties, national organizations, and institutions" signed the Platform on Joint Activity, initiated by the Muslim National Council of Sandzak. Much to the public's surprise, the platform was signed by Izudin Susevic, leader of the Sandzak reformists, and at one time Sulejman Ugljanin's sharpest critic.

This was interpreted as an unnatural alliance of civic and nationalistic parties but also as Susevic's pragmatic move, who, by following the old adage about two sides fighting, in this case Sulejman Ugljanin and Rasim Ljajic, is trying to extract maximal political advantage.

Susevic claims that the signing of the platform does not mean "giving the Reformist Democratic Party to

Sulejman Ugljanin." "The cooperation ensued after extensive preparations and negotiations, and thanks to the fact that for the first time ever, similar and identical political stances formed the basis." The reformists will keep their party's independence, and they will stay true to the idea of a regionalization of Sandzak "as a part of Yugoslavia and an area with numerous specific national, historical, ethnic, and cultural traits."

Some of the smaller Muslim parties have joined Ugljanin's coalition for strictly practical reasons. There is rumor in Novi Pazar that certain Sandzak party leaders have sold their "political independence" to Ugljanin in exchange for rent for office space and telephone bills.

In spite of such stories, it can be said that all Muslim parties share a common fear and that is that Belgrade's real goal is to change the region's demographic structure. Rasim Ljajic also stressed this and said that the Yugoslav authorities "are not showing any positive signs of changing this goal, not even after the signing of the Dayton Agreement." The SDA branch in Priboj claims that pressure to emigrate is particularly strong in this part of Sandzak, and that it comes in the form of Sarajevo Serbs wishing to exchange their property for property in Sandzak.

In Kosovo's Shadow

Since Belgrade has not shown any interest in Sandzak's problems, the largest Muslim party had no choice but to turn to the international community, which is clear from Lajic's recent meetings with (Malin Lutz), special envoy for the Balkans within Bildt's group, and (Henry Kelly), associate to Holbrooke's successor John Kornblum.

Since the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, the Sandzak issue has been largely overshadowed by other minority problems, primarily in Kosovo. True, Sandzak was regularly put on the agenda of various conferences on former Yugoslavia, but all the conclusions boiled down to general formulations regarding human rights protection. This was true of the London conference on the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in August 1992, and all consequent summits. A commission for Sandzak was also formed at the Geneva conference, the Sandzak issue was regularly broached in reports drafted by the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], State Department, and former and current UN human rights rapporteurs Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Elizabeth Rehn.

Ljajic's SDA has also maintained regular contacts with Serbian opposition parties, although exceptional cooperation with the local Serbian Renewal Movement faltered at a higher level after Vuk Draskovic's recent statement in which he denied the existence of Bosniaks in Sandzak.

The SDA has also maintained traditionally good relations with parties of ethnic minorities, particularly with the Vojvodina Hungarians. It is expected that the Sandzak SDA will participate at the forthcoming Subotica meeting of ethnic minority parties, organized by the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians. Unlike Rasim Ljajic, the other Sandzak Muslim politicians and parties cannot boast more significant cooperation with the Serbian opposition.

[Box, p 5]

Money Before Politics

Sandzak towns are traditionally the economically least developed regions of Serbia. Thus according to a new law, the municipalities of Tutin, Sjenica, and Prijepolje have been included in the group of economically underdeveloped regions. Novi Pazar, with 80 percent of the republic's average, has been taken off the list. [sentence as published]

In spite of this, the two industrial "giants" in Sandzak's largest town, the Raska Textile Plant and Ras Shoe Factory, are mostly out of work. In several state-owned companies, salaries are irregular and they average some 100 dinars. Novi Pazar citizens are mostly concerned over the fact that the private sector is significantly faltering.

Black marketeering has all but died out, the Novi Pazar flea market has lost the edge in competition with the ones in Subotica and Tuza. Shoe manufacturers are still more or less stable, but jeans manufacturers are thinking about changing jobs. Considering the circumstances, it is no wonder that the Novi Pazar citizens are more concerned about economic rather than political issues.

[Box, p 5]

Yugo-Bosniaks

The otherwise disunited Muslim parties agree on one thing—the necessity of establishing close ties with Bosnia. The SDA supports normalization between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but Rasim Ljajic is worried by the fact that "in his public addresses, Milosevic mostly mentions entities which he gives state attributes, yet very rarely mentions Bosnia as an internationally recognized state."

The SDA has announced an initiative for obtaining dual Yugoslav and Bosnian citizenship for Yugoslav citizens "who consider Bosnia to be their mother country."

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Izudin Susevic also supports this initiative because he believes that dual citizenship is a result of the Dayton accord. "Muslims who live in Serbia and Montenegro can be Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens in the same way that Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be Yugoslav citizens," Susevic believes. The Novi Pazar JUL believes that this is "a marginal issue that science should provide an answer to. The issues of economic development and mutual coexistence are far more important."

Serbia: Sources Hint at Government Reshuffle in Apr

AU2603194796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Mar 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "There Will, After All, Be Changes in the Serbian Government at the Beginning of April"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There will quite certainly be changes in [Serbian Prime Minister] Mirko Marjanovic's cabinet at the beginning of next month. This has been confirmed for NASA BORBA by several sources close to the Serbian Government, which responded to a recently published—and, at the same time, refuted—piece of news about a reshuffle of the prime minister's cabinet.

It was confirmed to us on that occasion that Radovan Pankov and Jovan Radic were resigning from their posts as ministers, with the explanation that they had, in fact, lost their positions when at the recently completed convention of the Socialist Party of Serbia, they did not succeed in entering the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] Main Committee.

Branislav Ivkovic, a minister in the Serbian Government, told NASA BORBA that he did not want to become deputy prime minister, since he already had "quite enough responsibilities."

Some sources have announced that there would be a purge in the SPS parliamentary group as well as in the Serbian Assembly. The reshuffle of Marjanovic's cabinet is seen by the Yugoslav United Left as a confirmation of their good relations with the SPS, but they do not reject the possibility that the Yugoslav United Left ministers (Milosavljevic, Kostic) might no longer be members of the government. Mirko Marjanovic's position has been assessed as firm.

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